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Abstract
Safety is paramount to the chemical process industries. Because many processes operate at high temperatures
and/or pressures, involving hazardous chemicals at high concentrations, the potential for accidents involving
adverse human health and/or environmental impacts is significant. Thanks to research and operational efforts,
both academically and industrially, the occurrences of such incidents are rare. However, disastrous events in
the chemical manufacturing industry are still of relevant concern and garner further attention – the Deepwater
Horizon incident (2010) and the Texas City refinery explosion (2005) being two recent examples.
Many techniques have been developed to understand, quantify, and predict alarm and safety system failures.
In practice, hazards are identified using Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis, and a network of
independently-acting safety systems works to maintain the probabilities of such events below a Safety
Integrity Level (SIL). The network of safety systems is studied with Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA),
which uses failure probability estimates for individual subsystems to project the failures of entire safety system
networks.
With few alarm and safety system activations over the lifetime of a chemical process, particularly the critical
last-line-of-defense systems, the failure probabilities of these systems are difficult to estimate. Statistical
techniques have been developed, attempting to decrease the variances of such predictions despite few
supporting data. This thesis develops methods to estimate the failure probabilities of rarely activated alarm
and safety systems using process and operator models, enhanced by process, alarm, and operator data. Two
repeated simulation techniques are explored involving informed prior distributions and transition path
sampling. Both use dynamic process models, based upon first-principles, along with process, alarm, and
operator data, to better understand and quantify the probability of alarm and safety system failures and the
special-cause events leading to those failures.
In the informed prior distribution technique, process and alarm data are analyzed to extract information
regarding operator behavior, which is used to develop models for repeated simulation. With alarm and safety
system failure probabilities estimated for specific special-cause events, near-miss alarm data are used, in real-
time, to enhance the predictions.
The transition path sampling method was originally developed by the molecular simulation community to
understand better rare molecular events. Herein, important modifications are introduced for application to
understand better how rare safety incidents evolve from rare special-cause events. This method uses random
perturbations to identify likely trajectories leading to system failures – providing a basis for potential alarm
and safety system design.
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ABSTRACT 
 
PREDICTING ALARM AND SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE USING 
SIMULATION 
Ian H. Moskowitz 
Warren D. Seider 
 
 Safety is paramount to the chemical process industries.  Because many processes 
operate at high temperatures and/or pressures, involving hazardous chemicals at high 
concentrations, the potential for accidents involving adverse human health and/or 
environmental impacts is significant.  Thanks to research and operational efforts, both 
academically and industrially, the occurrences of such incidents are rare.  However, 
disastrous events in the chemical manufacturing industry are still of relevant concern and 
garner further attention – the Deepwater Horizon incident (2010) and the Texas City 
refinery explosion (2005) being two recent examples.   
 Many techniques have been developed to understand, quantify, and predict alarm 
and safety system failures.  In practice, hazards are identified using Hazard and 
Operability (HAZOP) analysis, and a network of independently-acting safety systems 
works to maintain the probabilities of such events below a Safety Integrity Level (SIL).  
The network of safety systems is studied with Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), 
which uses failure probability estimates for individual subsystems to project the failures 
of entire safety system networks.   
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With few alarm and safety system activations over the lifetime of a chemical process, 
particularly the critical last-line-of-defense systems, the failure probabilities of these 
systems are difficult to estimate.  Statistical techniques have been developed, attempting 
to decrease the variances of such predictions despite few supporting data.  This thesis 
develops methods to estimate the failure probabilities of rarely activated alarm and safety 
systems using process and operator models, enhanced by process, alarm, and operator 
data.  Two repeated simulation techniques are explored involving informed prior 
distributions and transition path sampling.  Both use dynamic process models, based 
upon first-principles, along with process, alarm, and operator data, to better understand 
and quantify the probability of alarm and safety system failures and the special-cause 
events leading to those failures.   
In the informed prior distribution technique, process and alarm data are analyzed to 
extract information regarding operator behavior, which is used to develop models for 
repeated simulation.  With alarm and safety system failure probabilities estimated for 
specific special-cause events, near-miss alarm data are used, in real-time, to enhance the 
predictions.   
The transition path sampling method was originally developed by the molecular 
simulation community to understand better rare molecular events.  Herein, important 
modifications are introduced for application to understand better how rare safety 
incidents evolve from rare special-cause events.  This method uses random perturbations 
to identify likely trajectories leading to system failures – providing a basis for potential 
alarm and safety system design. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
 Despite much attention and many efforts, accidents in the chemical manufacturing 
industries are relevant, costly, and occasionally fatal.  In the past four years, over 100 
fatalities have occurred in the United States due to a wide variety of accidents
 (“Worker 
Fatalities to Federal and State OSHA”).  There have been incidents in the past decade that 
have drawn much attention due to their severe nature – BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
(“U.S. Chemical Safety Board Report: BP Deepwater Horizon”), Texas City refinery 
explosion (“U.S. Chemical Safety Board Report: BP America Refinery Explosion”), and 
the Kleen Energy Systems explosion (“U.S. Chemical Safety Board Report: Kleen 
Energy Natural Gas Explosion”), to name a few.  Each of these accident scenarios 
involves two critical similarities – an unexpected event occurred, and the event was not 
handled properly by operators and plant managers (Kletz, 2009).  Because many 
chemical plants involve dangerous chemicals, high temperatures, high pressures, or are in 
environmentally fragile areas (e.g., the Gulf Coast), the impacts of accidents can be quite 
large.  The Texas City refinery explosion claimed the lives of 14 workers and injured 
over 100 more.  The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill devastated the environment along 
much of the Gulf Coast, and was one of the most costly accidents ever, having damage 
estimates as high as 42 billion dollars.  While these events are rare, their impact is 
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sufficiently high to warrant further research aimed at predicting, mitigating, and 
preventing these accidents. 
 The typical approach to preventing accidents in a chemical manufacturing process 
involves process design coupled with design of operating strategies, process 
controlsystems, and safety systems.  Processes can be designed such that they are 
inherently less sensitive to disturbances in process units and feedstock fluctuations.  This 
approach, known as inherently safer design (ISD), often varies process-to-process, with 
specific process units or features installed to handle potential accidents before they 
develop (Hendershot, 2006).  On the inlet of sensitive reactors, it is common for 
designers to introduce buffer tanks to dampen deviations in feed flow rates, compositions, 
temperatures, and pressures.  Separation units commonly involve extra trays, bed depth, 
or membrane areas – permitting continued operation in the face of large disturbances.  
Some units are designed to be used only when a problem arises in a plant.  In many cases 
involving pipes designed for gas flow, a pressure-release line is installed.  When the 
pressure exceeds an upper bound, gas can be redirected to the release line and flared so 
that it doesn’t rupture a pipe.  Stop valves are typically installed on the inlet and outlet of 
sensitive processing units – allowing operators to isolate problems that occur upstream of 
the unit or within the unit.  Various indices and statistical approaches for quantifiably 
evaluating and rationalizing ISD have been developed (Srinivasan et al., 2012). 
 Disturbances in a plant occur on a frequent basis, often minute-to-minute, and 
need to be handled in an efficient manner.  While process design features can help to 
dissipate disturbances, they are often not responsible for arresting them.  This is the role 
of the process control system.  PID controllers are the most basic – a variable is 
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measured, and based on its deviation from its setpoint, the controller typically opens or 
closes a valve in part or in full (Luyben, 1989; Stephanopoulos, 1984).  Here, the 
controller must be tuned properly, and the measuring device and actuator must be 
functioning properly.  If not, there is potential for the disturbance to propagate further.  
Control configurations involving PID controllers have been developed, such as cascade 
or feedforward controllers.  These provide tighter and/or more robust process control, 
assuming that the measuring devices and actuators are working properly.  Model-
predictive controllers use first-principle or empirical models to yield actuator responses 
that minimize deviations from set points over the predictive horizon (Garcia et al., 1989).  
They often improve controllability, but process-model mismatch may keep controllers 
from adequately arresting disturbances. 
 When the process design features and control systems are insufficientto regulate a 
disturbance, the operator, often in response to alarms, is responsible for any corrective 
actions to move the process back to typical operating conditions with a safety interlock 
system shutting down the process when it deviates sufficiently far from these conditions 
(Crowl et al., 2001).  Operators typically have the ability to make adjustments to decision 
variables in a process, open and close valves, and switch control systems on and off, and 
are aided by a network of alarms.  When alarms activate to notify operators that process 
variables have crossed thresholds, the operators are expected to: (1) diagnose the root 
cause of the problem, and (2) make appropriate corrective actions to mitigate the 
consequences (Hollifield et al., 2010).  This can be a difficult task, particularly when the 
root cause problem is shrouded; i.e., the process is undergoing inverse response or there 
is an undetected rare event occurring.   
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In addition to the operator, there is an automated safety interlock system.  Interlocks work 
to shut down the plant automatically when specific process variables, called primary 
variables, cross defined thresholds.  The automatic safety interlock system is important 
because it shuts down the process before safety systems, such as quench tanks or relief 
valves, are activated as a last line of defense in preventing the process from entering a 
runaway reaction mode where human health and environmental catastrophes are possible.  
Plant operator actions are important in the continued operation of a process, and safer 
operation is realized when plant operators are effective in preventing processes 
from undergoing shutdown (and associated restart) and activating crucial safety 
systems.   
  Alarms are placed on process variables to alert operators that the process is 
deviating from its expected regime(s) of operation.  A typical alarm has a low-threshold 
(for L alarms) and a high-threshold (for H alarms) that bound the range of typical 
operation.  When the measured variable moves outside these thresholds, an alarm is 
activated and a special-cause event has occurred.  The L and H-alarm thresholds, along 
with more severe alarm thresholds, are established during the commissioning phase of a 
process, typically the first one to three years of operation.  During the design phase, 
several measured variables are chosen as primary variables.  Strong candidates for 
primary variables are those that best describe the safety of the process – often, the 
measurements associated with the most potentially dangerous operations (i.e., process 
units at high temperature or pressure, or containing hazardous chemicals).  Ideally, safety 
interlocks are activated only when these variables move into unsafe regimes (Rothenberg, 
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2009).  The choice of alarm thresholds and primary variables has a major impact on the 
effectiveness of the operator response to alarms to reliably maintain safe operation.   
Areas of unsafe operation are commonly determined using hazard and operability, 
HAZOP, analyses (Kletz, 1999).  This common and systematic approach is intended to 
determine all potential hazards to process units.  All potential material inlets (through 
designed inlet ports and backflow through outlet ports, as well as leaks through the vessel 
walls) are considered, and the potential chemical reactions are postulated.  Mechanical 
failures to piping and valves and electrical failures to compressors, motors, and control 
systems are also considered.  HAZOP has long been performed as a qualitative approach, 
but computer-based HAZOP approaches and algorithms have been developed, in an 
effort to reduce the amount of human error that arises during the hazard identification 
procedure (Venkatasubramanian et al., 1994; Palmer et al., 2008).  Human error and 
“safety culture” has been incorporated into HAZOP approaches, with operator mistakes 
and failures studied as potential causes of hazards to process operation (Kennedy et al., 
1998).  The qualitative analysis is then enhanced using quantitative statistics – the failure 
rates of similar process units are used to gain an understanding of the most severe process 
risks.  This analysis is often the basis for determining the primary variables in the 
process.  Process variables associated with the greatest potential hazards or risks are 
chosen as primary variables, ensuring that an automatic shutdown is attempted when 
these variables are far outside their typical operating regions.   
With potential hazards to process operation identified, independently-acting 
safety systems are installed to maintain the probability of failure below a pre-specified 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) (Dowell, 1998).  The independently-acting safety systems are 
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commonly evaluated using event-trees, where the probability of the network of safety 
systems failing is the product of the failure probability of each activated safety system 
(Andrews et al., 2000; Phimister et al., 2003).  As illustrated using the “Swiss Cheese 
Model”, an accident occurs when the various levels of safety systems fail or are 
insufficient (Reason, 1990). 
 
Figure 1.1.  Swiss cheese model  
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), is the industry standard to quantify the accident 
probability for specific special-cause events, typically indentified during HAZOP 
(Summers, 2003).  This quantitative procedure is valuable in characterizing the safety of 
a process during a special-cause event.  More recently, techniques to evaluate the 
process’s safety through a period of human error have been developed (Baybutt, 2002; 
Baybutt, 2003).  Various techniques to quantify the failure probability of individual 
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safety systems and the network of safety systems have been developed, all sharing the 
challenge of few safety system activations over the lifetime of a process.  Bayesian 
networks (Marsh et al., 2008) and neural networks (Ruilin et al., 2010) have been utilized 
to quantify these failure probabilities.   
While LOPA estimates the probability of safety system failure, Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) estimates the probability of special-cause event occurrence.  The varying 
paths leading to a special-cause event are identified and process statistics are used to 
characterize the probability of such an event occurring (Khakzad et al., 2011; Tanaka et 
al., 1983).  These estimates can be combined with previous event-tree approaches for 
analyzing the failure probability of the safety system network during a special-cause 
event.  This “bow-tie” approach tracks the special-cause event from its root-cause 
through the safety system activation (Cockshott, 2005).   
In some cases, alarms are officially considered a layer-of-protection and 
contribute to the SIL rating of the overall safety system.  Therefore, the alarms are 
included in the safety-systems discussed herein – noting that often the full alarm system 
is not considered part of a plant’s safety instrumented system (SIS).  The failure 
probabilities of specific safety systems, as well as the network as a whole, are often 
difficult to estimate – the activation of most safety systems occur infrequently, and 
oftentimes the root-cause of the event is poorly understood.  If the failure probabilities of 
safety systems, could be known with certainty, the probability of accidents at a process 
could be guaranteed below the SIL with proper safety system design.  Various techniques 
and methods for quantifying the failure probabilities of rarely activated safety systems 
have been developed, and this thesis explores new techniques in this area. 
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Dynamic Risk Analysis (DRA) is used to update risk estimates over the lifetime 
of the plant (Meel et al., 2006; Kalantarnia et al., 2009).  As process and alarm data are 
collected, in real-time, DRA updates the risk estimations that were made during the 
design and commissioning phases.  Typically Bayesian statistics (Bayesian analysis) are 
used to generate failure probability estimates using alarm data (Pariyani et al., 2012a).  
The Bayesian approach has the potential to generate failure probabilities having lower 
variance than those achieved using classical statistics, and is explained in Chapter 2. 
DRA performs best in describing the risk of frequently activated safety systems – with 
more data available, estimates with narrower confidence intervals can be made.  For 
infrequently used systems, copulas have been introduced to make risk estimates with 
smaller variances (Pariyani et al., 2012b; Yi et al., 1998).  Copulas describe the 
dependence between the more frequently-activated, low-consequence systems with 
infrequently-activated, high-consequence systems.   
While dynamic risk analysis and copulas are effective in making meaningful risk 
estimates for many infrequently-used systems, data may be too sparse to permit copulas 
to reduce the variance of risk estimates sufficiently.  Many processes, such as the steam-
methane reformer studied herein, are well-understood, and special-cause events are 
generally handled reliably by plant operators.  This thesis explores model-based 
approaches for better understanding the failure probabilities of operator responses to 
alarms that rarely lead to safety interlock activations and associated plant shutdowns.  
Process models, while not a perfect representation of the process, can be simulated many 
times, generating a large pool of simulated alarm and safety interlock activations.  These 
statistics can then be enhanced with process and alarm data, when available, to improve 
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the failure probability predictions.  Various sampling techniques are developed and 
applied to safety systems.  In particular, this thesis explores informed prior distributions 
and transition path sampling.  These sampling techniques utilize both process and 
operator models, enhanced by process and alarm data collected at the plant.  Pathways, or 
trajectories, to safety interlock activations are explored.  While the safety interlock 
activations investigated are inherently rare, the failures have the potential to be 
catastrophic in the unlikely event that safety interlock systems fail.  At best, the safety 
interlock system activations are expensive due to lost product and process shutdowns.  
The three chapters describing these techniques are briefly introduced in the next three 
sections. 
 
 
1.2 Chemical Process Simulation for Dynamic Risk Analysis: Developing Informed 
Prior Distributions  
 
Chapter 2 describes how dynamic simulations of a manufacturing process can be 
used to construct informed prior distributions for the failure probabilities of alarm and 
safety interlock systems.  Bayesian analysis is used starting with prior distributions and 
enhancing them with likelihood distributions, constructed from real-time alarm data, to 
form posterior distributions, which are used to estimate failure probabilities.  The use of 
alarm data to build likelihood distributions has previously been investigated.  Rare-event 
historical data are typically sparse and have high-variance likelihood distributions.  When 
high-variance likelihood distributions are combined with typical high-variance prior 
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distributions, the resulting posterior distributions naturally have high variances yielding 
unreliable failure predictions.  In contrast with prior distributions obtained by maximizing 
entropy and those that are based on expert knowledge, this chapter introduces a repeated-
simulation method to construct informed prior distributions having smaller variances, 
which in turn yield posterior distributions with lower variances and a more reliable 
prediction of the failure probabilities of alarm and safety interlock systems.  The 
application of the proposed method is demonstrated for the offline dynamic risk analysis 
of a steam-methane reformer (SMR) process.   
 
 
 
1.3 Improved Predictions of Alarm and Safety System Performance Using 
Process and Operator Response-Time Modeling  
 
In Chapter 2, a repeated-simulation process-model-based technique for 
constructing informed prior distributions is introduced.  The models used in simulation 
are crucial to the low-variance risk predictions generated by the sampling technique.  
This chapter investigates the effect modeling has on the risk predictions, and how both 
process and operator models can be systematically improved to generate more accurate 
risk predictions.  This chapter presents a method of quantifying process model quality, 
which impacts prior and posterior distributions used in Bayesian Analysis.  The method 
uses higher-frequency alarm and process data to select the most relevant constitutive 
equations and assumptions.  New data-based probabilistic models that describe important 
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special-cause event occurrences and operators’ response-times are proposed and 
validated with industrial plant data. These models can be used to improve the estimates of 
failure probabilities for alarm and safety interlock systems. 
 
 
1.4 Understanding Rare Safety and Reliability Events Using Transition Path 
Sampling 
 
There is strong motivation to understand how rare reliability and safety-events 
develop and propagate.  Effective operator training, safety system design, and safety 
analysis, all benefit from a full understanding of such events.  A major challenge in the 
study of events that propagate to process shutdowns or safety incidents is their sparsity – 
typically these events occur so rarely that statistical techniques alone are incapable of 
describing and characterizing them – especially when they have not yet occurred.  
Simulation of these events could be useful to understand them, however, a daunting 
computational challenge exists.  Typical rare events occur on the order of years or 
decades apart, while the events occur within minutes or hours.  Thus, the bulk of the 
computational effort in simulating rare events is allocated to normal operation, making 
the events computationally infeasible to simulate with meaningful frequencies.   
 A rare-event sampling technique, Transition Path Sampling (TPS), has been 
developed by the molecular dynamics community.  While the time and length scales 
between molecular dynamics and process dynamics differ greatly, the ratios of the times 
of the rare events and the waiting times between them are similar.  This Monte-Carlo 
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based technique relies on the simulation of perturbed rare-event trajectories – an initial 
rare-event trajectory is randomly modified such that large numbers of trajectories are 
generated.  Clusters of rare safety-event trajectories are the basis for alarm and safety-
system design, assuring that TPS-generated clusters are preventable.  Important 
modifications to the TPS technique are needed to apply it to process dynamics.  The 
backwards integration, a key attribute of TPS, is not possible for most process 
simulations – instead a boundary-value optimization technique is used.  Furthermore, 
process models use vast amounts of process data for model verification and to estimate 
the relative likelihood of one trajectory to another.  The application of TPS is 
demonstrated using a simple jacketed exothermic CSTR, as well as a more complex air 
separation process.  This innovative approach allows for a quantitative rationalization of 
alarm and safety systems to reduce the occurrence of rare, yet serious, safety events. 
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Chapter 2 
Chemical Process Simulation for Dynamic Risk Analysis 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
 The design of accurate process models and optimal flowsheets have challenged 
process systems engineering researchers for decades – often involving optimizations with 
decision variables (such as feed-stock or operation variables) adjusted to increase 
revenue, decrease cost, or increase profit (Seider et al., 2009).  From a controls 
perspective, controller parameters are tuned to improve performance measures (Seborg et 
al., 2010).  Furthermore, superstructures are used to determine which process units and 
controllers should be included for optimal functionality (Yeomans et al., 1999).  But, 
process models and flowsheets have been under-investigated in the process safety area, 
where process engineers are challenged to reduce the risk of incidents, the most serious 
of which may be classified as accidents.  Process incidents, resulting in human-health 
losses, environmental losses, and capital losses, are expensive and occasionally tragic 
(when safety systems are insufficient to prevent process incidents from becoming process 
accidents)
 
(U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board; Process Safety 
Incident Database).   
 To design and operate a process with reduced incident and accident risk, it is 
crucial to quantify the probabilities of incidents.  This can be a difficult task, as it 
involves: (1) determining the probability of each special-cause event, (2) determining the 
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probability of each consequence arising from each special cause, and (3) evaluating the 
severity of each consequence
 
(Pariyani et al., 2010; Mannan et al., 1999).  To quantify 
accurately the overall risk of an incident, these three tasks are required for every special 
cause, consequence, and loss, providing quite a daunting challenge!  The success or 
failure of an alarm system depends upon the success or failure of operator actions taken 
in response to an activated alarm.  In contrast, the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) 
takes automatic actions such as a shutdown initiated by an interlock.  In this paper, the 
focus is on simulating the effects of special cause events to inform and improve design 
and operation decisions to mitigate incidents.  In this manner, process engineers and 
operators can make more informed decisions to reduce plant risk (Phimister et al., 2003; 
Jones et al., 1999).   
 Emphasis is placed on constructing sufficiently accurate process simulations to 
evaluate plant safety, given measured process and alarm data.  Clearly, special attention 
is needed: (i) in the most risky plant areas, and (ii) when special-cause events are likely to 
be amplified or masked
 
(Rosenthal et al., 2006).  The former typically involve high 
temperatures, pressures, and hazardous chemicals.  The latter are more difficult to 
identify, especially when their responses occur in rapid transients.  Masked responses 
include inverse responses and delays (dead-times) which may lead operators to take 
incorrect action in response to alarms.  Here, dynamic, first-principles, process models, 
built with knowledge from historical process and alarm data
 
(Chen et al., 1998), can help 
operators respond better to these special-causes.  While first-principles models have long 
been used in the chemical process industries to enhance an understanding of processes
 
 15 
 
(Soroush et al., 1992), this paper provides a new method to estimate the failure 
probabilities of alarm and safety interlock systems.   
The rest of this chapter begins with a discussion of typical alarm and safety 
interlock systems and their associated event trees and failure probabilities.  Next, 
Bayesian analysis is reviewed, followed by the presentation of a new method that uses 
dynamic simulations to create informed prior distributions for Bayesian analysis.  Then, a 
detailed steam-methane reforming (SMR) model integrated with a pressure-swing 
adsorption (PSA) model is presented and the proposed method is demonstrated by 
simulating the combined model.  To our knowledge, no published integrated SMR-PSA 
model exists including recycle of the PSA-offgas to the SMR fuel system.  Finally, 
conclusions are drawn with recommendations for future work.  
 
 
2.2. Safety Systems and Event Trees 
 
An abnormal event occurs when a process variable leaves its normal operating 
range (green-belt zone in Figure 2.1), which triggers an alarm indicating transition into 
the yellow-belt zone.  If the variable continues to move away from its normal range, the 
variable may transition into its red-belt zone, indicated by a second-level alarm (e.g., LL, 
HH) activation.  Once a variable remains in its red-belt zone for a pre-specified length of 
time (typically on the order of seconds), an interlock activates and an automatic shutdown 
occurs (Hosseini et al., 2007). 
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Green-Belt Zone
Red-Belt Zone
Yellow-Belt Zone
Time
Primary
Variable
Value
H-Alarm Threshold
HH-Alarm Threshold
Yellow-Belt Zone
Red-Belt Zone
L-Alarm Threshold
LL-Alarm Threshold
 
Figure 2.1.  Belt-zone map for primary variables.  
 
An event-tree corresponding to a primary variable’s transition between belt-zones 
is shown in Figure 2.2.  The first-level (e.g., L, H) alarm system activates safety-system 1 
(SS1), which is typically an operator action.  When SS1 is successful, with probability    
1-x1, continued operation, consequence C1, is achieved.  The second-level (e.g., LL, HH) 
alarm system activates SS2, which is typically a more aggressive operator action.  When 
successful, with probability 1-x2, near-miss continued operation, consequence C2, is 
achieved.  If the primary variable occupies the red-belt zone for a pre-determined length 
of time (on the order of seconds), SS3, the automatic interlock plant shutdown, will 
become activated. The interlock system is designed to be independent of alarm systems, 
and the activation of SS3 is determined by an independent set of sensors.  It should be 
noted that if the interlock system is designed to have no delay time, the probability of SS2 
 17 
 
success is equal to zero (x2 = 1).  If SS3 succeeds, with probability 1-x3, the interlock 
shutdown is successful and an accident is avoided, represented by consequence C3.  If the 
interlock shutdown is unsuccessful, an accident occurs at the plant, represented by C4.  
With proper design, x3 should be very small consistent with the specified Safety Integrity 
Level (SIL) (Stavrianidis et al., 1998; Stavrianidis et al., 2000).
 
Since the interlock 
system is independent of the alarm system, the success of SS3 will not depend on factors 
such as operator skill or alarm sensor fault.  However, it can be concluded that if either 
SS1 or SS2 are successful in arresting the special-cause event, the activation of the 
interlock system can be avoided altogether.  In some cases, alarms are officially 
considered a layer-of-protection and contribute to the SIL rating of the overall safety 
system, composed of SS1, SS2, and SS3.  Therefore, the alarms are included in the safety-
systems herein – noting that often the full alarm system is not considered part of a plant’s 
SIS. 
In this way, event trees represent the actions of various alarm and safety interlock 
systems and their end consequences after abnormal events
 
(Meel et al., 2006).  For 
dynamic risk analyses, alarm and interlock actions must be chronologically tracked and 
recorded (using the plant alarm historian).  Using data compaction techniques and 
Bayesian analyses, failure probabilities of the alarm and safety interlock systems and the 
probabilities of plant incidents
 
(Pariyani et al., 2012a; Pariyani et al., 2012b) have been 
estimated.   
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(Operator 
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Shutdown)
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C4 (Plant Accident)
C3 (Plant Shutdown)
1-x1
1-x2
1-x3x1
x2
x3
Figure 2.2.  Event tree involving three safety systems. 
 
 
2.3. Bayesian Analysis 
 
 Bayesian analysis is often used to determine the failure probabilities of alarm and 
safety interlock systems.  The central dogma of Bayesian analysis is that random-variable 
distribution parameters (e.g., mean and variance) are themselves distributions.  Unlike 
classical statistics that seeks to capture the true moments of a distribution, Bayesian 
statistics acknowledges that the moments of a distribution may not be fixed, and seeks to 
estimate the probability distributions of the moments.  This analysis often requires 
significantly fewer data to make meaningful predictions (Gelman et al., 2014; Berger, 
2013).  Additionally, as the process dynamics and operators’ behavior change with time 
(because of factors such as process unit degradation and operators’ improved skills), real-
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time data can be collected and used to estimate more accurate failure probabilities in real 
time. 
 In Bayesian analysis, the posterior distribution, represented as        , the 
probability distribution of          given the collected data,  , is calculated using 
Bayes’ rule: 
 
            
            
                
 
 
     (2.1) 
 
where       is the prior distribution of   , estimated before data are collected, and 
        is the likelihood distribution of the data given   .  The prior distribution is 
normally estimated using expert knowledge or maximum entropy techniques (Ahooyi et 
al., 2014).  The likelihood distribution captures the probability that the data could have 
been generated, if the failure probability was equal to   , as discussed next. 
 
  Herein. a beta distribution is used to represent an informed prior distribution, 
which is constructed using process simulations: 
 
          
      
        
  
         
                 (2.2) 
 
where   and   are parameters obtained through simulation, and      is the gamma 
function: 
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    (2.3) 
 
The beta distribution is well suited to represent a safety-system failure-probability 
distribution because its domain is [0, 1], and its two parameters can be estimated from 
only two moments (e.g., the mean and variance) of simulated data. 
   
The alarm data provides a record of each safety system activation, which can be tracked 
to its failure or success.  The binary performance lends itself to being described using a 
binomial likelihood distribution:  
 
            
  
        
  
       
      (2.4) 
 
where   represents the alarm data,   is the number of safety system activations, and   is 
the number of safety system failures. When Eqs. (2.2) and (2.4) are substituted into Eq. 
(2.1), the posterior distribution for   , given   and   is: 
 
            
        
                
  
           
       
 
        
                
  
           
          
 
 
   (2.5) 
 
This is a beta distribution with parameters         and          , 
recognizing that   is a function of    only.  Note that for the beta distribution in Eq. (2.2), 
a =   and b =  .  Consequently, using the identity: 
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      (2.6) 
 
the posterior distribution in Eq. (2.5) simplifies to the beta distribution: 
    
           
        
              
  
           
                       (2.7) 
 
As alarm data are collected in real time, the alarm statistics can be updated in real time 
(Meel et al., 2006; Khakzad et al., 2012; Kalantarnia et al., 2009).  In so doing, process 
engineers gain a better understanding of how the process is performing (Pariyani et al., 
2012b). 
 
 
2.4. Constructing Informed Prior Distributions 
 
The proposed method of construction of informed prior distributions has the eight 
steps listed in Table 1.  In Steps 1-3, a robust, dynamic, first-principles model of the 
process incorporating the control, alarm and safety interlock systems, is built.  The model 
can then be simulated using a simulator such as gPROMS (gPROMS v.3.6.1; Oh, et. al., 
1996), which is used herein.  The control system in the model mimics the actual plant 
control system, with consistent control logic and tuning.  Likewise, the alarm and safety 
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interlock systems in the model mimic those in the plant.  For operator actions, this can be 
difficult, as operators often react differently to alarms.  In particular, expert operators 
may take into account the state of the entire process when responding to alarms.  When 
creating a model, the likelihood of operator actions must be considered.  Either the 
modeler can use the action most commonly taken by operators, or a stochastic simulation 
can be set up in which the different actions are assigned probabilities. 
With these models, special-cause events are postulated in Step 4.  The list of 
special-cause events can be developed from various sources: HAZOP or LOPA analysis, 
observed accidents in the plant (or a similar plant), near-miss events at the plant (or in a 
similar plant), or from risks suggested in first-principles models of the plant.  For each 
special-cause event, an event magnitude distribution is created in Step 5.  A distribution 
for operator response time, τ, is created in Step 6.  These three distributions are used 
along with the dynamic simulation in Step 7 to obtain simulation data.  Lastly, in Step 8, 
the simulated data is used to regress parameters for the informed prior distribution.  The 
algorithm used to generate simulation data (Step 7) and regress informed prior 
distribution parameters (Step 8) is described in the paragraph below, and represented 
pictorially in Figure 2.3. 
The script that manages the dynamic simulations starts by sampling A1 from the 
event magnitude distribution created in Step 5.  Note that Figure 2.3 shows a Normal 
distribution centered at µSC with variance σ
2
SC, however any distribution can be used.  
Assign the number of safety system failures, i, to i = 0.  With this A1, the user script 
samples τ1 from the distributions created in Step 6.   Although Figure 2.3 shows Uniform 
distributions (with the maximum operator response time at τmax), any distribution can be 
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used.  With A1 and τ1, a dynamic simulation is run.  If the safety system fails to avoid a 
plantwide shutdown, then i = i + 1; if the safety system is successful, i is not incremented.  
When n < N, n = n + 1; i.e., for sampled Ai and τi, a dynamic simulation is run, and i is 
adjusted when necessary.  After N iterations, j1 = i/N is calculated, in the range [0,1].  
Then m is incremented and Am sampled, the inner loop is re-executed, and jm is calculated.  
When the outer loop has been completed (m = M), a vector of M elements (j1, ..., jM) has 
been accumulated.  The average and variance of this vector is used to calculate   and   of 
the Beta distribution.  Note that because the Beta distribution is the conjugate prior of the 
binomial likelihood distribution, it is the recommended choice.  The number of 
simulations, M×N, is chosen, recognizing that more simulations yield a smaller prior-
distribution variance.   
 
Table 2.1.  Steps to Construct an Informed Prior Distribution 
1. Develop a dynamic first-principles process model 
2. Incorporate control system into the dynamic process model 
3. Incorporate the alarm and safety interlock system into the dynamic process 
model 
4. Postulate potential special-cause events to be studied 
5. For each special-cause event, construct a distribution for the event 
magnitudes, ASC (i.e., for a postulated pressure decrease, construct a probability 
distribution for a decreasing magnitude) 
6. For each special-cause event, construct a distribution for operator response 
time, τ. 
7. For each special-cause event, conduct the simulation study according to 
the algorithm described in Figure 2.3 to simulate the range of possible event 
magnitudes, ASC, and operator response time, τ.  
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8. Estimate parameters of a distribution model (e.g., Beta distribution) 
representing the data generated in Step 7 – this is used as an informed prior 
distribution (Gelman et al., 2013).   
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Start
m = 1
Am ~ g1(Am)
n = 1
i = 0
τ ~ g2(τ)
Run Simulation with 
Am, and τ
SS Fails
i = i + 1
n < N
n = n + 1
jm = i/N m < M
m = m + 1
E[f(x)] = Σ(jm)/M = μ 
Var[f(x)] = 
Σ((jm-μ)
2)/(M-1) = σ2 
Solve for (α,β):
μ = α/(α+β)
σ2 = αβ/([α+β ]2⨯[α+β+1])
α>0, β>0
f(x)=Beta(α,β)
Stop
True
True True
False
False False
 
Figure 2.3. Sampling algorithm used in Steps 7 and 8 in Table 2.1.   
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2.5. Steam-Methane Reforming (SMR) Process 
 
A typical SMR process is shown in Figure 2.4.  After pretreatment, natural gas 
feed (70) and steam (560) are mixed before entering the process tubes of an SMR unit 
(90), where hydrogen, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide are produced.  This hot 
process gas (100) is then cooled and sent to a water-gas shift converter (110), where 
carbon monoxide and water are converted to hydrogen and carbon dioxide.  The process 
gas effluent (120) is cooled in another heat exchanger, producing stream 170, which is 
sent to two water extractors.  Note that the last section of this heat exchanger is used to 
transfer heat to a boiler feed water makeup stream in an adjacent process.  The gaseous 
hydrogen, methane, carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide, in stream 210, are sent to PSA 
beds.  Here, high-purity hydrogen is produced (220), and the PSA-offgas is sent to a 
surge drum.  Stream 800 from the surge drum is mixed with hot air (830) and a small 
amount of natural gas makeup (815), and sent to the furnace side, where it is combusted 
to provide heat to the highly-endothermic process-side reactions.  Its hot stack gas (840) 
is sent through an economizer, where it is used to heat steam (520), some of which is 
used on the process side (560), with the rest available for use or sale as a steam product 
(570). 
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Figure 2.4.  SMR process flow diagram 
 
 In modeling for process safety, emphasis should be placed on units that present 
the greatest risk; i.e., have the largest probabilities of incidents multiplied by incident cost
 
(Kalantamia et al., 2009).  In an SMR process, temperatures rise above 1,300 K with 
pressures over 20 atm.  Because overheating can lead to process-tube damage and failure, 
potentially leading to safety concerns, its model received special attention in this work.  
Partial differential and algebraic equations (PDAE’s), that is, momentum, energy and 
species balances, accounted for variations of pressure, temperature, and composition in 
the axial direction for both the process- and furnace-side gases.  For the reforming tubes, 
the rigorous kinetic model (Xu et al., 1989)
 
was used, while the furnace-gas combustion 
reactions were modeled using a parabolic heat-release profile.  Convection and radiation 
were modeled on the furnace-side, where view factors were estimated using Monte-Carlo 
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simulations and gray-gas assumptions.  The heat transfer on the process side was 
modeled by convection only, assuming a pseudo steady-state between the process gas and 
catalyst.  Details of the models are Section 2.6. 
The PSA beds represent a cyclic process, with beds switched from adsorption to 
regeneration on the order of every minute.  This type of separation scheme induces 
oscillatory behavior throughout the SMR process.  As the flow rates, compositions, and 
pressures fluctuate in effluent streams from the PSA beds, variables throughout the entire 
plant fluctuate as well.  In processes with such cyclical units, buffer tanks are often used 
to dampen fluctuations.  However, typical buffer-tank sizes (comparable to SMR-unit 
sizes) reduce the amplitude of these fluctuations by on the order of 50%.  Herein, the 
SMR process test-bed involves four PSA beds, which operate in a 4-mode scheme, with 
each bed undergoing adsorption, depressurization, desorption, and repressurization steps.  
PDAE’s are used to model the momentum, energy, and species balances, dynamically 
tracking pressure, temperature, and composition in the axial direction.  Langmuir 
isotherms are used to model adsorption kinetics.  Details of the models are in Section 2.7. 
In the full safety process model, the SMR-unit and PSA-bed models are used in 
conjunction with dynamic models for the water-gas shift reactor, water extractor, surge 
tank, heat exchanger, and steam drum.  Furthermore, the controls used with the dynamic 
process model are consistent with those used in the real process.  The full process is 
modeled using the software package, gPROMS.  A challenging aspect of the full process 
model involves convergence of the PSA-offgas recycle loop.   
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To my knowledge, no published SMR model exists with this level of detail.  In particular, 
this process model combines SMR and PSA-bed units within a plant-wide scheme with 
PSA-offgas recycle.  The results computed by gPROMS are consistent with the process 
data from the industrial plant.  This plant-wide model is extremely useful for building 
leading indicators and prior distributions of alarm and safety interlock system failure 
probabilities.   
 With a dynamic process model, process engineers can simulate special cause 
events and track variable trajectories.  Consider an unmeasured 10 percent decrease in the 
Btu-rating, due to a composition change of the natural gas feed (40), in Figure 2.4.  Note 
that the makeup stream (815) on the furnace side is relatively small and is not changed in 
the simulation.  Initially, because the process stream contains less carbon, less H2 is 
produced.  Because these reactions are endothermic, less heat from the furnace is 
consumed by the reactions and the furnace temperature rises, as shown in Figure 2.5.  
Also, the process-side temperature increases.  Eventually, the low-carbon PSA-offgas 
reaches the SMR furnace.  With less methane for combustion, the furnace temperature 
decreases, as does the temperature of the process gas.  This effect is shown in Figure 2.5.  
Note that the temperatures oscillate due the natural gas oscillation in stream 800 from the 
PSA-offgas surge tank – due to the cyclic nature of the PSA process.   
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Figure 2.5.  SMR effluent temperatures for a 10% decrease in the Btu 
content of the natural gas feed.   
 
2.5.1. Reformer Model 
 
 The SMR herein is a top-fired unit consisting of approximately 400 process tubes.  
Steam and CH4 are fed on the process side (Stream 90 in Figure 2.4).  In the tubes, H2 is 
produced via a set of endothermic reactions.  On the furnace side, a fuel source (Stream 
817) is combusted to provide heat for the process side.  A schematic of the SMR unit is 
shown in Figure 2.6 (Latham et al., 2011). 
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Figure 2.6.  Front-view schematic of SMR.  
 
The model proposed by (Latham et al., 2011), which describes the SMR in the steady-
state, was converted to a dynamic model.   Also, for the furnace-side, radiation view 
factors replaced the software RADEX used by Latham.  In this work, the SMR is 
modeled as four units: the process gas, the process tubes, the furnace gas, and the 
reformer brick.  The process gas and the furnace gas are modeled as networks of 
PDAE’s, having derivatives with respect to time ( ) and axial direction ( ).  Each model 
is discretized in the axial direction with central-difference approximations.  The resulting 
ODEs are integrated in time, with the discretized equations solved for the state variables 
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at the end of each time step.  The process tubes and reformer brick are modeled as 
networks of PDAE’s, having derivatives with respect to time ( ), axial direction ( ), and 
lateral direction (y).  These are also discretized in the spatial coordinates with central 
difference approximations.  
In the process and furnace gas models, the state variables are the molar flow rates of each 
species i (   ) and temperature ( ).  For the process gas, the mass balances for species i 
are: 
 
 
  
      
 
  
 
  
                                                   (2.8) 
 
and the energy balance is: 
 
 
  
           
 
  
 
  
           
  
 
                                (2.9) 
 
where    is the concentration of species i, AC is the cross-sectional area of a process tube, 
     is the stoichiometric coefficient of species i in reaction j, Cv is the molar heat capacity 
at constant volume,  Cp is the molar heat capacity at constant pressure, h is the heat-
transfer coefficient, r is the inner tube radius, Ttube is the tube wall temperature,  and     
is the enthalpy of reaction j.  The heat capacities are functions of Ci, which are functions 
of   and    :  
 
                          ,                           (2.10) 
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                                         (2.11) 
  
                              (2.12)  
          
These functions are used in Eqs. (2.8) and (2.9). 
 The reaction rates are calculated using the kinetic model of (Xu et al., 1989), 
which involves three reforming reactions: 
 
                      (R2.1)  
                      (R2.2) 
                                                                        (R2.3) 
 
The reaction rates are: 
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where: 
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and     ,      , and    are constants and η is a parameter that describes the diffusion-
limitation of the reaction.   
 Note that R2 and R3 are highly endothermic.  The Ergun equation is used to solve 
for the pressure: 
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where: 
 
   
         
     
      
 
and ρ is the gas density, vs is the superficial gas velocity, Dp is the catalyst particle 
diameter,   is the void fraction, and μ is the gas viscosity. 
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 The furnace gas model is similar with one major exception: radiation heat transfer 
is included in the energy balance.  The radiation heat loss rate emitted by a volume of gas 
is characterized as: 
 
             
          (2.17) 
 
where   is the gas volume,   is the gas emissivity (a function of composition, 
temperature, and pressure),   is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant, and T is the absolute 
temperature.  When incorporating radiation into the model, it is critical to remember that 
radiation can travel from any one section of the furnace unit to another without being 
absorbed first.  Said differently, each discretized section of furnace gas undergoes 
radiation heat transfer with each other discretized section of furnace gas, as well as each 
discretized section of process tube and reformer brick that is exposed to the furnace gas.  
It should be noted that the radiation heat-loss rate emitted by the process tubes and the 
reformer brick are, respectively: 
 
                          
      (2.18) 
                      
       (2.19) 
 
where Atube is the tube area for heat transfer, Awall is the wall area for heat transfer, and 
εtube and εwall are the emissivities of the tube and wall.  Thus, the energy balance for the 
discretized furnace gas volume p is: 
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The coefficients      represent the probability that a ray of radiation leaving the radiation 
zone   is absorbed by zone  .  These are calculated using Monte-Carlo techniques.  At 
each radiation zone, a large number of points are randomly chosen, each with a random 
direction (representing a ray of radiation emitted).  Each ray’s absorption is tracked, 
permitting the estimation of      for radiation heat transfer between zones p and q.  Also, 
the probability of a furnace zone absorbing a ray of radiation depends upon the zone’s   
value, with high   values characterizing a ‘gray’ gas, which readily absorbs radiation, and 
low   values characterizing a ‘clear’ gas which lets radiation pass through.  Therefore, 
the temperature, composition, and pressure of the furnace gas affect each      within the 
furnace (Hottel et al., 1967).  Because the Monte-Carlo integration for determining each 
     is difficult to install in gPROMS, the Monte-Carlo integration was carried out off-
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line for a grid of reasonable temperature, pressure, and composition values.  Within 
gPROMS, values of      are interpolated from this grid.   
 
Figure 2.7 shows solutions for the temperature profiles on the process- and furnace-sides 
of the SMR for typical operation.  On the furnace side, the temperature quickly rises in 
the first third of the unit, where the combustion reaction takes place.  Over the next two 
thirds of the unit, the temperature on the furnace side decreases as heat is transferred to 
the process side.  On the process side, the temperature increases throughout, however its 
slope is greatest where the furnace gas is hottest.  Species flow rates on the process side 
are shown in Figure 2.8, with the bulk of H2 produced in the top section, and more than 
half of the CH4 consumed.  Also note that the reformer is sufficiently long, and 
consequently, little reaction takes place near its bottom. 
 
 
Figure 2.7. Temperature profile in the SMR.  
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Figure 2.8.  Mole fraction profile on the process-side of the SMR.  
 
2.5.2. Pressure Swing Adsorption (PSA) Model 
 
The pressure-swing adsorption model consists of four beds, each of which is described by 
a set of PDE’s (derivatives are taken with respect to time and the axial direction) and 
associated boundary conditions.  The PSA cycle consists of four steps: adsorption, 
depressurization, desorption, pressurization.  At any given time, one of the beds is in each 
step, cycling to the next step every minute.   To model the PSA process, just a single 4-
bed unit was used, with each bed triple its size in the plant.  These beds are sufficiently 
large to adsorb all of the carbon-compounds during the 1-minute adsorption step.  Also, a 
larger surge tank is used to dampen the bed swings, because three 4-bed groups cycle out 
of phase, creating destructive interference among the limit cycles.   
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Using the method of lines, the PDEs were discretized in the axial direction with central-
difference approximations (and forward/backward differences at the boundaries) to 
represent the derivatives with respect to distance.  Then, backward-difference formulae 
were used to integrate the resulting ODEs in time.  The following state variables were 
used in modeling the beds: temperature, pressure, gas density, gas velocity, mole fraction 
of each species, loading of each species on the adsorbent, and the equilibrium loading of 
each species on the adsorbent.  The Langmuir Isotherm was used to calculate the 
equilibrium loading of each species.   
Below is the schedule used for a 4-bed PSA cycle, similar to that implemented by 
Agarwal et al. (Agarwal et al., 2008), and Khajuria and Pistokopolous
 
(Khajuria et al., 
2011) (for a 2-bed cycle) and used herein.  The four beds (A, B, C, and D), shown 
schematically in Figure 2.9a, cycle through four steps, 1-4, during modes 1-4.  Initially, 
just prior to the first mode, bed A is at high pressure (HP) and unoccupied (U) by species 
to be adsorbed;  bed B is also at HP, but occupied (O); bed C is at low pressure (LP) and 
O; and bed D is at LP and U.  The valves are open or closed as shown.  During the first 
mode, bed A implements step 1; bed B, step 2; bed C, step 3; and bed D, step 4.  In mode 
2, A moves to step 2, B to step 3, C to step 4, and D to step 1.  Similar moves are made 
for the third and fourth modes.  For the PSA in the SMR process, the beds are occupied 
with CH4, CO, and CO2, and unoccupied with H2, which is used to desorb the adsorbents 
– HP > 20atm, and LP = 1.5 atm – each mode (and step) is of duration, 1 min. 
Next, the four steps are described, focusing on bed A.  Note that Figures 2.9a-d, show the 
states of each bed and the valve positions at the start of each mode.  In this analysis, it is 
assumed that the valves are adjusted instantaneously.      
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 Step 1: Adsorption in bed A (see Figure 2.9a at outset of mode 1) 
o Step 1 begins with bed A at HP and U 
o The water extractor effluent (210) is fed to the base of bed A (valve A1 open) 
o A high-purity stream of H2 leaves the bed (valve A3 open), as the adsorbent 
accumulates CH4, CO, and CO2 in time, with most of the H2 product sent in stream 220 to 
the H2 Product tank, and the remainder sent to bed C (valve C4 open). 
 
 Step 2: Depressurization of bed A (see Figure 2.9b at outset of mode 2)  
o Step 2 begins with the valve A1 and A3 closed.  
o Gas exits the pressurized bed through the base of bed A (valve A2 open), and in 
time the pressure in the bed equilibrates to a lower pressure (pressure of the surge tank) 
 
 Step 3: Desorption in bed A (see Figure 2.9c at outset of mode 3)   
o Step 3 begins with valve A4 open, with H2 product from bed C entering the top of 
bed A 
o Reminder: bed A is at LP and O 
o In time, the H2 product adsorbs on the adsorbent and the CH4, CO, and CO2 is 
released into the PSA-offgas 
 
 Step 4: Pressurization of bed A (see Figure 2.9d at outset of mode 4)  
o Step 4 begins with valve A2 and A4 closed 
o The water extractor effluent (210) is fed to the base of bed A (valve A1 open) 
o In time, the pressure of bed A equilibrates to the pressure of stream 210 
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a. Mode 1 of the PSA cycle 
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b.  Mode 2 of the PSA cycle 
Figure 2.9.  Schematic of PSA process.  
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c. Mode 3 of the PSA cycle 
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d. Mode 4 of the PSA cycle 
Figure 2.9.  Schematic of PSA process (Cont'd.) 
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To evaluate process safety using dynamic risk analysis, it's important to monitor the 
breakthrough of CH4, CO, and CO2  in the product H2 stream.  Previous models did not 
consider simulating a carbon breakthrough into the H2 product stream, since they use a 
semi-infinite boundary condition with respect to molar composition at the end of the bed
 
(Agarwal et al., 2008; Khajuria et al., 2011).  The model developed herein uses the same 
boundary condition, but at the end of an elongated bed.  In this way, the semi-infinite 
B.C. (zero derivative) is maintained at the end of the elongated bed, but a methane or 
CO/CO2 breakthrough at the end of the bed can be observed.  Shown in Figure 2.10 is the 
mole fraction of H2 in the PSA bed during Step 1 of the PSA cycle.  The mole fraction of 
H2 along the bed is shown minute-by-minute.  In time, the purity of the H2 product 
stream, taken at the exit of the 1 meter long bed, drops below an acceptable level (set 
point).  Clearly, this model is capable of simulating a carbon breakthrough into the H2 
product stream. 
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Figure 2.10.  Simulated mole fraction of H2 along the PSA bed during Step 1.  
 
The most important aspect of the PSA modeling as it relates to dynamic risk analysis of 
the SMR process is the oscillations in the PSA-offgas.  PSA-offgas is fed to the surge 
tank from the PSA bed undergoing Step 3 (desorption.)  When a PSA bed switches to 
Step 3, its concentration of carbon compounds is the highest.   This is because the 
adsorbent near the bottom of the bed, z = 0, contains the most    /   /  .  In Step 3, 
the carbon compounds are continuously desorbed, and consequently, the concentration of 
H2 in the PSA-offgas increases.  Because the PSA-offgas provides fuel for the furnace 
side of the SMR, the oscillations in its Btu-rating are important.  Most significant, for the 
4-bed model, are the oscillations in the effluent for  the surge drum, which are shown in 
Figure 2.11.  This is consistent with documentation for the industrial process studied. 
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Figure 2.11.  Simulated PSA-offgas Btu-rating  
2.6. SMR Informed Prior Distributions 
 
For the SMR process in Figure 2.4, a loss in steam pressure to the reformer-side 
(stream 560), was simulated with the responses of the safety systems monitored.  For 
small disturbances, the process control system handled the effect of steam pressure 
decreases.  There is a flow controller on the steam line, whose set point is generated using 
a linear equation involving the flow of natural gas into the SMR process-side, seeking to 
achieve a constant steam-to-carbon ratio in the process tubes.  This control system 
normally arrests typical fluctuations in steam pressure and flow rate, but for large steam-
pressure decreases, feedback control alone is insufficient.  In this case, the control valve 
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is wide-open, with a flow rate insufficient to accompany natural gas fed to the SMR-unit.  
For this reason, an investigation was undertaken to assess the effectiveness of the alarm 
systems associated with the SMR steam line.  When the steam flow rate is below its L-
alarm threshold, the steam-to-carbon ratio drops, accompanied by an increase in the 
process-side temperature, and potential tube failure.  Because of these operating limits, an 
interlock was placed at the HH-alarm threshold with a time delay.  This time delay, of 
several seconds, reflects that the temperature threshold may be exceeded in this case for a 
short period of time and permits the operator to respond rapidly in an attempt to bring the 
furnace temperature below its HH-alarm threshold.   
Three operator responses to the alarm are simulated: (1) the valve on the steam line is 
opened, (2) the valve on the makeup fuel line is pinched, and (3) the dampers associated 
with air flow in the furnace are opened (effectively increasing air flow rate).  When the 
operator is able to bring the furnace temperature below the HH-threshold before the 
interlock delay times out, an automatic shutdown is avoided.  If, however, the operator is 
unable to do so, the interlock is activated and a plant shutdown occurs.  The simulated 
abnormal event leads to either a success of SS2 (interlock is avoided), or a failure of SS2 
(interlock is activated).  It is desirable to have a reliable estimate of x2, the probability 
that the operator is not successful, despite only a few activations of this HH-alarm during 
the recorded history over several years.   
 Herein, a pressure decrease in the steam line to the process-side of the SMR-unit 
was simulated.  The magnitude of the pressure decrease was a random variable, sampled 
from a normal distribution centered at 50% of stream pressure.  The response time of the 
operator was taken as a random variable, sampled from a uniform distribution ranging 
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from 0 to 15 seconds.  The operators three responses were all incorporated into the 
simulation as step-changes in valve settings.  One thousand simulations were run, and the 
effectiveness of the operator’s response in each simulation was tracked.  In some 
simulations, the operator successfully reduced the furnace temperature below the 
interlock threshold in the allotted time before the automatic shut-down.  In others, the 
operator failed and the plant was shut-down.  In Figure 2.12, a temperature trajectories 
for events resulting in an interlock activation and in a near-miss are shown.  In the 
scenario where SS2 succeeds, the temperature is brought below the interlock threshold 
within the interlock delay time.  Note that the action of the control system was observed 
early in the trajectory, but it was insufficient to avoid the abnormal event and eventual 
plant shut-down.  The average number of safety-system failures was recorded for the 
simulations, as well as the failure variance, which were used to generate a beta-
distribution to describe the failure probabilities.  The beta-distribution, which has just two 
parameters, was created easily and is supported only in the range [0,1], which bounds the 
failure probability. 
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Figure 2.12. Furnace outlet temperature for a decrease in steam pressure. 
 
 This informed prior distribution was built using dynamic simulations with first-
principle models.  Even with no data available to update the distribution, process 
engineers and plant operators can make improved risk predictions
 
(Levenson et al., 2014).  
The alarm data are used to build a likelihood distribution, in this case a binomial 
likelihood distribution of a few trials, all of which are successes.  In Figure 2.13, the prior 
and posterior distributions are shown.  The informed posterior is shifted to the left of the 
prior distribution by the 0 percent failure rate observed in the data.  Unlike the commonly 
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used uninformed prior distributions, its posterior distribution has a similar shape to its 
informed prior distribution. The posterior distribution generated using the informed prior 
distribution can alert process engineers that a significant decrease in steam pressure has 
the high probability (>20%) of causing a plant shutdown.  This may lead operators to pay 
special attention to the steam pressure measurements, and may lead process engineers to 
install a more robust controller on the steam line. 
 
 
 
 Figure 2.13.  Prior and posterior distributions generated by dynamic 
simulations 
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2.7. Conclusions 
 
A method, involving repeated dynamic process simulations, for constructing informed 
prior distributions was presented.  The method was used in estimating the failure 
probabilities of alarm and safety interlock systems that are rarely called into action in 
chemical processes.  The method requires combining a dynamic, first-principles, process 
model with the control, and alarm and safety interlock systems.  Its application was 
demonstrated for offline dynamic risk analysis of a steam-methane reformer (SMR) 
process.  The high probability of a plant shutdown calculated by the method can alert 
operators to pay special attention to the steam pressure measurements, and may lead 
process engineers to improve the controller on the steam line, avoiding or reducing the 
cost of plant shutdowns.  Key aspects of the reformer/furnace and PSA models used to 
demonstrate the proposed methodology were presented.  The modeling of probable 
operator responses with respect to operator skill, shift (day or night shift), severity of 
alarm (H/L or HH/LL), and the difficulty of diagnosing the special cause, among other 
factors, is considered in Chapter 3. 
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2.8. NOMENCLATURE 
A  area 
Am   special-cause magnitude m 
D   observed alarm data 
i    failure counter; number of failures for a sampled special-cause magnitude 
jm    observed failure probability for a sampled special-cause magnitude, m 
m  special-cause magnitude counter, m = 1, ..., M 
M   number of sampled special-cause magnitudes 
n  sample operator variables counter, n = 1, ..., N 
N   number of sampled operator variables per special-cause sample 
p    number of possible operator response orders (sequences) 
SSi   safety system i 
xi   failure probability of a safety system i 
Greek 
α   first parameter of the Beta distribution 
β   second parameter of the Beta distribution 
ε emissivity 
ΔP   sampled pressure decrease 
µ    average value of jm  
µSC   average of sampled special-cause magnitude  
σ2  variance of jm 
σ2SC  variance of sampled special-cause magnitude  
τ  operator response time 
τmax    maximum operator response time 
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Chapter 3 
Improved Predictions of Alarm and Safety System Performance 
Through Process And Operator Response-Time Modeling 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 In the chemical process industries, there are many incentives to mitigate the 
frequency and consequences of incidents and accidents (“U.S. Chemical Safety and 
Hazard Investigation Board”).  To evaluate the effectiveness of alarm and safety interlock 
systems reliably, the probabilities of alarm and safety interlock failures and the failure 
consequences must be quantified.  Said differently, to compare two safety systems, 
quantitative estimates for their effectiveness in mitigating special causes are needed, 
where a special cause is a disturbance the basic process control system is unable to arrest. 
This work proposes a method of improving process models and introduces new 
probabilistic models that describe special-cause event occurrences and operator response-
times, allowing for estimating alarm and safety-system failure probabilities more 
accurately.  In industrial practice, methods such as HAZOP and HAZAN are commonly 
utilized to make safety and reliability estimates of processes on a unit-operation basis.  
The estimated failure probabilities (from statistical data and manufacturer estimates) of 
specific components are used to estimate failure probabilities in a process.  But, more 
recently, dynamic risk analysis has been employed to update these probabilities as real-
time data are measured.  The focus herein is on events that are inherently rare, where 
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failure predictions remain uncertain.  A process model is utilized to generate simulation 
data that enhance sparse measured data.  The effects of decisions involving process 
models, special-cause events, and operator behavior, on risk predictions are investigated. 
 An informed prior distribution was constructed in Chapter 2, shown in Figure 
2.13, to estimate the distribution of failure probabilities (  ) of the safety system 
associated with the HH-Temperature alarm (   ) in the SMR furnace.   Special-cause 
events were repeatedly simulated involving a substantial decrease of steam pressure at the 
inlet of the SMR reactor – sufficient to cause the furnace temperature to rise out of its 
green-belt zone through its yellow-belt zone, and into its red-belt zone.  It was shown that 
without operator actions, the short interlock time delay,      , would elapse and the 
process would undergo an automatic shutdown.  When the operators responded 
sufficiently quickly to the special-cause event, simulations showed the process often 
returning to its green-belt zone, with the interlock shutdown avoided.  The distribution of 
the simulation results estimates that     fails at about a 20% rate during these dramatic 
pressure decreases; i.e.,   the process is estimated to undergo an automatic shutdown in 
20% of these rare cases - this is not a projection of the process accident rate or the 
interlock shutdown rate.  
In process operation,     responded successfully to the rare HH-alarm 
activations, resulting in sparse alarm data.  A binomial likelihood distribution was used to 
calculate the posterior distribution of    given the alarm data  .  Since all of the collected 
data were successful     actions, the posterior distribution is shifted to the left of the 
prior distribution.  With just a handful of     activations, the resulting likelihood 
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distribution has a very large variance, and the accuracy of the informed prior distribution 
to the posterior distribution is uncertain.  If the process had undergone hundreds of     
activations, the accuracy could be assessed.  This poses a major challenge – how can the 
user be confident that the process and operator behavior models are sufficiently accurate 
given few data to assess the accuracy of the informed prior distribution?  If the models 
used to generate the informed prior distribution do not predict the special-cause event 
well, the results obtained from the posterior distribution may be unreliable.   
 
 
3.2. Development and Refinement of Models to Construct Informed Prior 
Distributions  
 
 Over years of process operation,     activations are infrequent, but still provide 
sufficient data for studying the propagation of special-cause events.  The activation of 
    is rarer, occurring 
 
  
 times less frequently – often resulting in very sparse data.  
While the data associated with     are insufficient alone to analyze the performance of 
the safety system, the similarities between the safety systems can be utilized.  The 
activations of both safety systems originate from a control system failure, which, for 
example, can be due the large magnitude of the disturbance, the inability of the control 
system to handle the disturbance, and/or the occurrence of an electrical or mechanical 
failure.  It is assumed that the same group of operators are involved.  If highly skilled, 
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they should arrest the special-causes at a high rate (Meel et al., 2007; Meel et al., 2008; 
Chang et al., 2007).  
 Clearly, the need for urgent responses of      are greater.  Also, when operators 
take action (e.g., as furnace temperatures become elevated), the need to respond within 
the interlock delay times dominate their concerns and actions.  This would normally 
stimulate a strong reaction to avoid automatic shutdown.   
 As the fundamental basis for the proposed method, a sufficiently-accurate first-
principles process model is needed. Also, the automated safety system models should be 
sufficiently accurate.  The second model, represented by        in Figure 2.3, is the 
distribution of special-cause event magnitudes to be simulated.  The operator behavior 
model,      , unlike automatic safety systems, must reflect human behaviors.  Here, the 
speed and effectiveness of operator responses often depend on the state of the process, 
the number of competitive active alarms, distractions, personal health and conflicts, and 
the like.   
 In the method introduced herein, first,     models are constructed and validated 
with plentiful data.  After constructing these models, and validating them with measured 
    data, they are modified to handle     activations (recognizing that their rare 
occurrences do not allow for reliable model validation).  In the next three sections, all 
three models are described with respect to    .  Their modifications to handle     
activations are then described.  Lastly, the failure probability estimates generated by 
using the      informed prior distributions are presented. 
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3.2.1. Dynamic Process Models 
 
 Because dynamic first-principles process models are widely used, approaches to 
model development are not considered here.  Instead, this section focuses on model 
evaluation and improvement for constructing informed prior distributions.  
 Often, process engineers have developed dynamic process models for control 
scheme testing during the design phase.  These are commonly used initially for carrying 
out dynamic risk analysis.  However, process models used for process design and control 
are normally developed to track responses in their typical operating regimes (green-belt 
zones) – but may not respond to special-cause events with sufficient accuracy; i.e., their 
predictions far from set points may be poor for risk analysis.  Consequently, dynamic 
process models should often be improved to construct informed prior distributions. 
 For the SMR process shown in Figure 2.4, four dynamic process models are 
constructed, as summarized in Figure 3.1.  The first, Process Model A, is the same as the 
one described in Chapter 2.  This model includes constitutive equations to model  the 
endothermic reformer reactions, the furnace that provides their heat, the exothermic 
water-gas shift reaction, the separation of hydrogen product from offgas in adsorption 
beds, and the production of steam (for process heating or sale), as well as models of 
associated PID controllers.   
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Figure 3.1.  Steam-methane reforming process models.  
 
 In Process Model A, to model the radiative heat transfer (~90% of the total heat 
transfer to the tubes), view factors are estimated from each surface or volume zone to 
each other zone, with the dynamics of radiative heat transfer modeled between all 
discretized zones (Hottel et al., 1967).  The remaining convective heat transfer is simpler, 
because heat transfer only occurs between physically adjacent zones (Latham et al., 
2011).   
In Process Models B and D, convection heat transfer is modeled only, with 
radiative heat transfer accounted for by overstating the heat-transfer coefficients between 
the furnace gases and tube surfaces.  Herein, to estimate the overstated heat-transfer 
coefficients, 50 steady-state windows were identified in the historical process data.  Each 
window corresponds to a duration of operation, on the order of a day, where process 
variables are at steady state.  Many different steady-state windows exist in the process 
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data due to different demand rates of hydrogen and steam, different feed ratios of steam 
to natural gas, and natural aging of the catalyst (in the reformer as well as the water-gas 
shift reactor). The heat-transfer coefficient was estimated from the temperature and flow 
rate of the process and furnace gas inlet and outlet measurements.   
 In Process Models A and B, the reforming reaction kinetics proposed by (Xu et 
al., 1989), which have been shown to be quite accurate over a broad range of 
temperatures and reactant concentrations, are used.  Note that, due to the presence of a 
complex denominator in the kinetic equations, the spatially-distributed SMR model can 
be difficult to converge.  Accurate guess values for the concentration of the reactants and 
products along the axial direction of the reformer tubes must be available, or generated 
using homotopy-continuation techniques, to converge the steady-state model.   
However, in Process Models C and D, elementary reaction kinetic equations are simpler 
to converge.  The rate constants of the elementary reactions are estimated, similar to the 
convection heat-transfer coefficients.  Using the data in the 50 steady-state windows, 
along with measured hydrogen product flow rates and offgas concentrations, the rate 
constants are estimated.     . 
 Initially, the four process models are compared in the 50 steady-state windows.  
Beginning with the measured inlet temperatures and flow rates for each mode, predicted 
and measured outlet temperatures are compared for each model.  The root-mean square 
outlet temperature differences are shown in Figure 3.2.  For this steady-state evaluation, 
Process Model A provided the best agreement with the data, whereas Process Model D 
was least accurate.  
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Figure 3.2.  Process model goodness-of-fit using steady-state and dynamic 
evaluations. 
 
However, because the models are used to estimate the responses to special-cause events, 
agreement with dynamics data is more important.  Fifty dynamic windows were 
identified in the historical process data – periods of time where the process variables 
describing the operation of the steam-methane reforming reactor are transient.  These 
windows are on the order of minutes to hours, and typically arise when hydrogen or 
steam demand rates change, feed ratios of steam to natural gas change, or operational 
changes occur in another process unit (such as a pair of pressure-swing adsorbent beds 
are taken offline). For each of the 50 dynamic windows, inlet temperature and flow rate 
trajectories are input to each model, with model-predicted outlet temperature trajectories 
compared to measured outlet temperature trajectories.    Dynamic predictions are 
typically less accurate than the steady-state ones.  Here, Process Model B outperforms 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Process Model A
Process Model B
Process Model C
Process Model D
Root-Mean-Square Temperature Difference [K]
SM
R
 M
o
d
e
l
Dynamic Evaluation
Steady-State Evaluation
 60 
 
Process Model C, but when comparing just steady-state outlet temperature differences, 
Process Model C provides a closer fit to the data.  Clearly, Process Model B should be 
selected, rather than Process Model C, when constructing informed prior distributions.   
Next, the four process models are used to construct informed prior distributions for the 
failure of SS1 – using the uniform distributions for special-cause magnitude and operator 
behavior used in Chapter 2.  The 300 measured SS1 failures/successes are then used to 
construct a low-variance binomial likelihood distribution (see Eq. (2.4)). The four 
informed prior distributions for the failure of SS1 and the binomial distribution are shown 
in Figure 3.3.   To compare the informed four prior distributions with this likelihood 
distribution, the ξi,m index is defined:   
 
          
 
 
                
 
 
        (3.1) 
 
where i represents the model (i = A, B, C, D) and m represents the data-based likelihood 
distribution.  This index ranges from [0, 1], where unity corresponds to perfect matching 
between the informed prior distribution of model i and the measured likelihood 
distribution m.  As shown in Table 3.1, this index is consistent with the dynamic model 
accuracies in Figure 3.2, but low levels of agreement are obtained.  Note that using more 
detailed operator response-time models, in the next subsection, the performance indices 
are improved significantly. 
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Figure 3.3.  Informed prior distributions created using the four process models, as 
well as the binomial likelihood distribution created using the measured alarm data. 
 
Table 3.1.  Performance Index for Process Models A-D. 
 
Process  
Model A 
Process  
Model B 
Process  
Model C 
Process  
Model D 
ξi,m 0.159 0.063 0.045 0.026 
 
3.2.2. Special-Cause Event Occurrence Model 
 
 When constructing informed prior distributions to estimate the failure 
probabilities of safety systems that act infrequently, it is important to assess the special-
cause events that can activate specific safety systems.  Given that process units fail in 
many ways (e.g., as inlet stream compositions, temperatures, flow rates, and pressures 
vary; controllers experience measurement bias; valves malfunction; controller electronic 
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mechanisms fail), special-cause modeling deserves attention.  Clearly, for specific 
special-cause events, known to trigger safety systems, it is crucial to account for them 
when creating informed prior distributions.  Some are known to have a high likelihood of 
occurrence over the lifetime of a plant, while others may be un-observed locally, having 
occurred at other plant sites or even related plants.  For all potential special-cause events, 
a probability distribution should be constructed, even when likelihood data are 
unavailable. 
When developing occurrence models to estimate safety system failure 
probabilities, special-cause events must be selected and their magnitudes must be 
investigated, as special-cause events are likely to have devastating consequences (e.g., 
propagation of runaway reactions, leading to explosions).  To identify these events, 
HAZOP and LOPA analyses, especially, are particularly helpful.  HAZOP is the industry 
standard for postulating all possible special-cause events. 
 The effect of a special-cause event (SCE) depends on its magnitude.  SCE models 
(e.g.,        in Figure 2.3) are needed to estimate failure probability distributions.  SCE 
models having low expected values are most representative and rarely activate second-
level alarms, while SCE models having high expected values represent extreme cases, 
allowing for the study of second-level alarms.  Various steam-pressure-decrease 
magnitudes are shown in Figure 3.4 – each being a delta function centered at its 
corresponding point on the abscissa.  The expected value of the SS1 failure probability, jm, 
is graphed accordingly. 
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Figure 3.4.  SS1 failure probability as a function of a steam pressure decrease. 
 
3.2.3. Operator Response-Time Models 
 
In the simulation of a special-cause event, the behavior of the operator must be 
well understood.  In Figure 2.3,       represents operator response times in taking action 
following activated alarms associated with SS1.  An initial construction of       can be 
made using the histogram of operator response times to high-frequency alarms.  This 
provides valuable information about how the operators tend to act when a variable is 
under alarm (Macwan et al. 1994; Bendoyl et al., 2006; Stylios et al., 1999).  In some 
cases, when operators anticipate that the alarm thresholds have been set conservatively, 
they are slower to respond to expected nuisance alarms.  On the other hand, when 
operators recognize that alarms tend to trigger a flood of alarms elsewhere in the process, 
they view these alarms as critical – even though they just signal entry into the yellow-belt 
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zone.  To the extent possible, it is important to make quantifiable justifications when 
modeling operator effectiveness (Hollnagel, 1998; Reason, 2000).   
A histogram of approximately 300 observed operator response times to the H-
alarm associated with the SMR furnace effluent temperature (Moskowitz et al., 2015) is 
shown in Figure 3.5.  The operator response times are collected using the alarm data log, 
which records the time of each alarm activation and the time of each operator 
manipulation.  The time between an alarm activation and the initial operator manipulation 
is the operator response time.  This calculation method provides the most accurate data 
on operator response time. Alarm data are convenient to work with, but without alarm 
data, process data can be sampled to obtain operator response times.  A script can be 
written to record  the times process variables cross their thresholds, as well as the times 
controlled-variable set points or actuators undergo step-changes (considered to be 
operator actions)
 
(Pariyani et al., 2012a).  In either case, the data sampling interval is 
important to consider.  If data are sampled or recorded infrequently (such as by a 
composition analyzer), operator response times may be inaccurate.  Depending upon the 
frequency of process data points, reasonable estimates of operator response times can be 
obtained.  The wide range of operator response times, nearly all well represented, suggest 
many kinds of operator actions.  The highest number of responses are associated with the 
shortest response times – with operators taking action in less than one minute.  Nearly all 
of the operator response times lie between zero and six minutes, with far fewer of longer 
duration.  Past a six minute response time, the number of responses decreases rapidly, 
with just three response times beyond eight minutes. 
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Figure 3.5.  Operator response time histogram. 
 
 Two parametric distributions are proposed to model the operator response-time 
distribution.  The first distribution is an exponential distribution, which is called Operator 
Response-Time Model A: 
 
          
                          (3.2) 
 
where   is a parameter to be estimated by maximizing the likelihood function:  
  
                              (3.3) 
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where i is the response counter, n is the total number of response times measured (on the 
order of 300), and    is response time i.  It is often convenient to maximize the log-
likelihood function instead of the likelihood function: 
 
                    
 
       (3.4) 
 
The maximum of the log-likelihood function has a simple analytical form: 
 
   
 
 
                                                                      (3.5) 
where    
   
 
   
 
 is the sample mean of the measured response times. 
 The second is a weighted-sum of three gamma distributions (Operator Response-
Time Model B): 
 
                  
 
   
  
  
     
                             
 
        (3.6) 
 
where each    is a weighting coefficient for gamma distribution j, and where    and    are 
the parameters   of gamma distribution j.  While any number of gamma distributions can 
be used, here the fourth distribution gives a negligible increase in the likelihood function 
(compared to the impact of the third distribution).  The eight parameters in Eq. (3.7) are 
estimated by maximizing the likelihood function:  
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     (3.7) 
 
Using Newton’s optimization method with an analytical Hessian matrix, the parameter 
values in Table 3.2 were estimated. 
 
Table 3.2. Parameters for Operator Response-Time Models A and B.   
                             
0.39 1.83 3.56 4.51 0.68 1.04 0.88 0.48 0.07 0.45 
 
While Operator Response-Time Models A  and B represent operator response 
times well, they do not account for the rate of change of each variable crossing its alarm 
threshold, as well as the number of activated alarms being monitored by an operator(s).  
Clearly, operator responses gain urgency, and often speed, when a variable crosses one of 
its thresholds rapidly.  Also, as the number of active alarms decreases, operators are less 
distracted and respond more rapidly. 
To account for the rate of change of each variable when the variable crosses an 
alarm threshold, using the SMR plant data, operator response times are displayed in 
Figure 3.6 as a function of the furnace effluent temperature derivative, 
  
  
, as the 
temperature crosses its high-alarm threshold.  The dependence of the operator response 
time,  , on the rate of change is well-described by: 
 
          
   
  
                                            (3.8) 
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where    and    are the model parameters.  These parameters are estimated by 
minimizing the sum of the squared errors: 
              
   
  
       
 
 
               (3.9) 
 
The estimated values of    and    as well as the corresponding       value are 
given in Table 3.3.   
 
 
Figure 3.6.  Operator response time as a function of temperature rate of change 
(plant data and model prediction). 
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Table 3.3. Parameters Used for Operator Response-Time Models C, D and E. 
   [min]   [s/K]        [min]         
4.33 1.54 302 3.8 4.2 413 
 
 To construct a       that accounts for the alarmed variable time-derivative, a 
stochastic component must be maintained – because if       were purely deterministic 
(like    ), the variance of the safety system failure probability with respect to    cannot 
be calculated.  While     is an estimate for the operator response time, it must be 
incorporated into a random variable distribution for  .  One choice for       is the 
exponential distribution having an expected value equal to    .  The exponential 
distribution in Eq. (3.8) is known to have an expected value of  
 
 
.  Therefore, Operator 
Response-Time Model C is proposed:  
  
          
 
   
   
  
  
    
  
   
   
  
  
     (3.10) 
 
A similar method can be used to account for the effect of multiple alarm activations in the 
process.  When many alarms are active, competing for operator(s) attention, response 
times are expected to increase.  Here, also, the exponential distribution is appropriate: 
 
            
                (3.11) 
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where   is the reciprocal of active alarms.  The parameters    and    are estimated by 
minimizing the sum of the squared errors: 
 
           
         
  
                (3.12) 
 
The estimated values for      and    as well as the corresponding      value are given in 
Table 3.3. 
 Using this logic, the Operator Response-Time Model D is formulated by setting 
the expected value of an exponential distribution equal to   : 
 
       
 
       
    
  
       
    (3.13) 
  
 Finally, the Operator Response-Time Model E is formulated that incorporates 
both     and    .  The effectiveness of     and     can be compared by their associated 
    .  Herein, the expected value of Operator Response Model E is set equal to: 
         
           
         
      (3.14) 
 
where the weighting coefficients for each distribution are proportional to their     .  
This yields Operator Response-Time E model: 
        
         
        
   
  
                  
     
         
        
   
  
                 
   (3.15) 
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Next, Operator Response-Time Models A-E are used to construct informed prior 
distributions for the failure probability of SS1, along with dynamic Process Model A.  The 
results are shown in Figure 3.7, along with the binomial likelihood distribution of the 
measured SS1 data, Eq. (2.4).  The model performance index, ξi,m, in Eq. (3.1) is used to 
quantify the model performance of Operator Response-Time Models A-E, with results 
shown in Table 3.4.  Operator Response-Time Models A and B, which are independent of 
the process state, describe the measured alarm data poorly.  As expected, Operator 
Response-Time Model B, with eight parameters, performs better than Operator 
Response-Time Model A, with just a single parameter.  The incorporation of     and     in 
Operator Response-Time Models C and D, clearly improves the informed prior 
distributions, with Model C performing better than Model D – expected because      < 
    .  Of the five models, Model E is in the closest agreement with the likelihood data.  
Given preferred Model E, the choice of process model can be revisited.  In Figure 3.8, the 
four dynamic process models are used to build informed prior distributions with Operator 
Response-Time Model E.  The model performance indices are shown for Process Models 
A-D in Table 3.5.  Once again, Process Model A yields the best agreement with the 
observed likelihood data, and can be considered the most appropriate process model.  
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Figure 3.7.  SS1 informed prior distributions constructed using the five operator 
response-time models (ORTMs) with dynamic Process Model A. 
 
Table 3.4.  Performance Index for Operator Response-Time Models A-E with 
Process Model A. 
 
ORTM A ORTM B ORTM C ORTM D ORTM E 
ξi,m 0.029 0.030 0.633 0.701 0.812 
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Figure 3.8.  SS1 informed prior distributions constructed using the four process 
models with Operator Response-Time Model E. 
 
Table 3.5.  Performance Index Revisited for Process Models A-D Using Operator 
Response-Time Model E. 
 
Process  
Model A 
Process  
Model B 
Process  
Model C 
Process  
Model D 
ξi,m 0.812 0.481 0.325 0.051 
 
 
3.3. Modeling     Failures Using Models with Parameters Estimated from     
Failures  
 Once the three types of models (process, special-cause event, and operator 
response-time models) are chosen and their parameters are estimated, they are used to 
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estimate the failure probabilities of    . These models must then be adjusted to handle 
simulations that involve the activation of     (i.e., after the failure of    ).  While it is 
desirable to keep the models intact, a few adjustments are recommended.   
 The dynamic process model, Process Model A, should not be altered much to 
simulate     activation events – because the simulations from high and high-high alarms, 
and beyond, are similar, with small changes in physical properties as temperatures rise.  
In general, Process Model A adjustments would be required when physical and chemical 
phenomena change abruptly – for example, with shifts from laminar to turbulent flows, or 
the introduction of two-phase flows.   
The Special-Cause Event Occurrence Model needs significant adjustment because the 
       distribution used for simulating L/H alarm activations infrequently activates 
LL/HH alarms.  To achieve this, a normal distribution is chosen for       , having 
mean    and standard deviation  .  A lower-tail, bounded by    and an upper-tail 
bounded by   , each two standard deviations from the mean, are defined:  
                           (3.16) 
noting that    is a special-cause magnitude closer to zero; that is, closer to typical 
operation.  The normal distribution is described by    and   ,  rather than the typical 
mean and standard deviation: 
          
 
   
     
 
 
 
 
     
    
     
 
 
 
  
     
 
 
     (3.17) 
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The lower bound of    is set at    values for which the L/H alarms failed in simulation – 
with smaller choices of    yielding many simulations where the LL/HH alarms are not 
activated.  Referring to Figure 3.4, with SS1 failures frequently observed when       , 
0.4 is a good lower bound for   .     is set such that the special-cause events are of 
interest and relevance.  Three Special-Cause Event Occurrence models are shown in 
Figure 3.9, each sharing       .  SCEM A has    closest to   , and samples special 
cause events that are most likely (closest to typical operation), yet have the least potential 
for SS2 failures.  The other extreme is SCEM C, which has    furthest from   .  SCEM 
B, having        , is chosen as an interior candidate to analyze the risk of SS2 
failures.  The choice of        has a significant impact on the estimated failure 
probabilities – the user must keep this in mind when analyzing the simulation results and 
making statements about the risk of the process.  The failure probability estimate attempts 
to describe the probability of failure while undergoing a special-cause event sampled 
from       , which is very different than typical day-to-day process fluctuations. 
  
Figure 3.9. Special-Cause Event Models for SS2 simulation. 
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 The Operator Response-Time Models also need adjustment, it being expected that 
operators react quicker to alarm activations that are associated with more urgent 
consequences.  Given an immediate threat of an automatic plant shutdown, operator 
actions should be accelerated.  To account for this, when     is activated to    , the time 
response to the     activation is divided by the ratio of the 90% percentile of operator 
response to a     activation,     , over the interlock shutdown time,      .  For this case, 
the Operator Response-Time Model E takes the form: 
       
         
        
   
  
                  
     
    
     
         
        
   
  
                 
 
     
    
          
(3.18) 
 
 Having constructed, chosen, and regressed the three types of models using the H-
alarm data, adjustments are made to model     activation events.  An informed prior 
distribution is then constructed for the failure probabilities of       Figure 3.10 shows the 
resulting informed prior and associated posterior distributions describing the failure 
probability of    .  The sparse alarm data are used to build binomial likelihood 
distributions that modify the prior distributions to form posterior distributions.  It can be 
seen that the most accurate posterior distribution (formed using Process Models A and 
Operator Response-Time Model E with an urgency adjustment for time responses in    ) 
is not shifted as dramatically as the posterior distribution formed using the simple 
informed prior distribution.  This indicates that the most accurate posterior distribution is 
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more effective at handling the special-cause simulations – leading to more accurate 
failure probability predictions.   
 
 
Figure 3.10.  Informed prior distributions and associated posterior  
distributions describing the failure probability of    . 
  
The interpretation of the posterior distribution is that during a severe loss in steam 
pressure, the probability that the process will undergo an automatic shutdown is on the 
order of 5%.  This allows engineers responsible for setting reliability estimates to have 
quantifiable justification when they do so.  An estimate for the reliability for various 
special-cause events can provide engineers with a broader understanding of the events 
that pose the greatest odds of an interlock activation, thus motivating different designs to 
handle these events.  The operator also benefits from these distributions, as he/she 
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becomes aware that, during such a severe pressure drops, his/her reactions have been 
projected to result in interlock activations after on the order of 5% of occurrences.  If this 
value is perceived to be too high, the operator may be motivated to act more urgently 
during this type of event.  
 
3.4. Conclusions 
 
Alarm and safety interlock system failure probabilities are difficult to estimate, 
but warrant careful consideration using the strategies introduced herein.  The safety of the 
operators and employees at a chemical plant, and those in the neighboring community 
and environment, is crucial to the chemical process industries.    For safety interlock 
systems and their associated alarms, statistical techniques on the sparse records of 
activations are alone insufficient to make meaningful evaluations of their failure 
probabilities.  The usage of alarm and process data associated with the relatively frequent 
alarm activations (e.g., H-alarms) to systematically improve the performance of less 
frequently activated alarms (e.g., HH-alarms) and safety interlock systems is very 
promising.  As demonstrated for an SMR plant example, the three types of models can be 
applied to a variety of chemical manufacturing processes.  The resulting models provide 
new insights into the performance of rarely-activated alarm and safety interlock systems, 
for which historical data are sparse.   
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Chapter 4 
Understanding Rare Safety and Reliability Events Using Transition 
Path Sampling 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
 Safety and reliability are paramount to the chemical manufacturing industries.  
Because chemical plants are often operated at high temperatures and pressures, and with 
hazardous materials, the potential for adverse human health and environmental impacts 
exists.  With proper process design, effective implementation of control and safety 
instrumented (SIS) systems  mitigate such risks.  Less severe are product losses which 
result from poor plant reliability.  As chemical manufacturing processes approach 
dangerous operating conditions, automatic safety interlocks activate, shutting them down 
before dangerous consequences are realized.  When functioning correctly, the dangerous 
consequences are avoided, but manufacturing processes lose valuable production over the 
time period encompassing the automatic shutdown, process maintenance, and startup.  
Furthermore, plant startup is often the most dangerous mode of operation because large 
transients are often not as well understood compared with steady-state and cyclic 
operations.  There is clear motivation, both financially and ethically, to prevent chemical 
manufacturing processes from operating in regions where safety interlocks are activated –
resulting in automatic plant shutdowns or potentially in safety incidents. 
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 Safety interlocks are often based on HAZOP (hazard and operability analysis)
 
(Kletz, 1999; Venkatasbramanian et al., 1994; Kennedy et al., 1998) and LOPA (layer of 
protection analysis)
 
(Dowell, 1998; Summers, 2003).  With HAZOP, potential hazards to 
personnel and capital equipment that may occur during process operation are identified 
through a meticulous (yet qualitative) procedure.  It provides “a more complete 
identification of the hazards, including information on how hazards can develop as a 
result of operating procedures and operational upsets in the process” (Crowl and Louvar, 
1990).  With LOPA, the probabilities of identified hazards occurring are maintained 
under a low, pre-specified value by utilizing a system of high-performing, independently-
acting safety systems.  Said differently, the hazards identified by HAZOP analysis are 
mitigated to lower-consequence events (such as plant shutdowns) with high probability 
by using safety systems identified through LOPA.  Through these analyses, safety 
interlock thresholds are determined.  From a reliability perspective, operators seek to 
avoid costly shutdowns by adjusting valves when control systems are too slow or 
insufficient in responding to severe disturbances (known as special-cause events).  
Avoiding shutdowns is also beneficial from a safety perspective, as transient shutdowns 
and startups are avoided. 
 Operators are aided by an alarm structure in which process variables pre-specified 
to be important to the reliability and safety of the process are equipped with alarms.  
When a variable moves outside of its typical (safe) operating region, the green-belt zone, 
either a low (L) or a high (H) alarm activates accordingly.  Often, process variables have 
several levels of alarms, possibly a yellow belt-zone (bounded by L and H alarms), an 
orange belt-zone (bounded by LL and HH alarms), and a red belt-zone (bounded by LLL 
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and HHH alarms).  Such an alarm scheme is depicted in Figure 4.1.  Here, in Figure 4.1a, 
a process variable is displayed over months and years,  normally residing within its 
green-belt zone – and, when perturbed into its yellow-belt zone, safety systems/operator 
actions usually return it to its safe green-belt zone.  Rare events result in the automatic 
shutdown (safety interlock) of the process, followed by a shutdown and restart, which 
occur over minutes and hours, as shown in Figure 4.1b.  The safety-interlock shutdown is 
activated when the process variable resides in the red belt-zone for a pre-specified length 
of time,      , typically on the order of seconds to minutes.  As a variable moves into 
each successive belt-zone, the operator becomes aware that interlock activation is 
impending and takes more severe actions to return the variable to its green-belt zone.   
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Figure 4.1. Alarm belt-zones and interlock shutdown for a process variable. 
 
 The alarm thresholds are set in the process commissioning phase
 
(Hollifield et al., 
2010), with competing objectives to: (1) assure that when an alarm is activated operators 
have sufficient time to act, avoiding subsequent (more severe) alarms or interlock 
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activations, and (2) that the alarm isn’t a nuisance, often activated unnecessarily, and 
often disregarded by operators.  Commissioning is usually performed using expert 
knowledge of process behavior (based upon the actions of similar processes and upon 
insights gained in the process design phase), and tests to observe typical transient 
responses of the variables.   
 Clearly, alarms are commissioned to alert operators to postulated, more common, 
events that could propagate to interlock activation.  But, alarm structures may be 
insufficient to alert operators to rare or un-postulated events.  Such unforeseen safety 
events have the potential to move to the red belt-zone and activate the interlock shutdown 
faster than the alarms/safety systems are designed to handle.  These events may arise 
early involving variables that are not alarmed, or when some combination of variables 
leads to such an event.  While these events may be easily handled by operators, without 
proper alarming, operators may not be able to prevent automatic shutdowns.   
A quantitative technique to better identify and understand events that lead to 
process shutdowns would be very useful to engineers responsible for commissioning 
alarms and operators that respond to those alarms.  This paper introduces transition path 
sampling (TPS) as such a technique for application in the chemical manufacturing 
industries.  TPS is a Monte-Carlo sampling strategy that simulates process models as they 
propagate toward interlock-activating events.  Trajectories of these events are randomly 
generated, uncovering many un-postulated events, and enabling postulated events to be 
better understood.  With many similar trajectories generated, the probability of a typical 
trajectory can be estimated, identifying the most likely unsafe events, suggesting more 
effective alarm thresholds.  TPS has been widely investigated by the molecular dynamics 
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community to study rare molecular events (Bolhuis et al., 2002; Dellago et al., 2002), but 
the application of TPS to process dynamics for studying rare interlock-activating events 
is novel and presents its own challenges. 
 
4.2. Transition Path Sampling  
 
 TPS was invented to study rare molecular dynamic trajectories; for example, the 
dissociation of a weak acid in an aqueous solution.  A weak acid, such as hydrofluoric 
acid (HF), dissociates in water in approximately a millisecond, but its dissociation event 
occurs in just nanoseconds (Bolhuis et al., 2002).  Hence, its initiation time is on the 
order of 10
6
 times longer than the event itself!  Clearly, simulation of the 
initiation/dissociation sequence involves excess computation time to track the initiation 
phase.  In TPS, to circumvent this, just one initiation/dissociation event is simulated.  
Then, at a random time,   , along the event trajectory (spanning [0,   ]), state variables are 
randomly perturbed (such as atom locations and momenta).  This new state is simulated 
forward spanning [       and backwards spanning [ 
   ].  If the acid is associated at   
 , and dissociated at     , then a second rare-event trajectory has been generated, 
which may be accepted.  Over many iterations, numerous rare-event trajectories can be 
generated, with minimal computational effort in simulating the initiation phase (Dellago 
et al., 2002).   
 When applied to process dynamics, TPS can identify and explain rare interlock-
activating events.  The models and time scales in process dynamics are vastly different 
 84 
 
from those in molecular dynamics, but the challenge of simulating rare-events is similar.  
A typical rare interlock-activating event may occur over years to decades, while the event 
itself occurs over minutes to hours.  Similarly, TPS can be used to circumvent simulating 
the initiation phase – the time in between rare safety-events of interest.  As shown in 
Figure 4.2a, a complete trajectory is identified by simulation (or by a rare safety event in 
a plant or similar facility elsewhere) and then randomly perturbed, as shown in Figure 
4.2b, allowing for the generation of many trajectories.  These perturbations are applied to 
state variables, often process unit temperatures, compositions, and pressures.  The 
perturbations are also applied to stochastic variables – either noise to operational and 
design parameters that effect multiple balance equations (parametric noise), or noise 
introduced as a term to a single balance equation (non-parametric noise).  The parametric 
noise can be used to explore rare-events that may arise when operational parameters 
(such as product demand rate or feed conditions) fluctuate in a specific pattern.  Design 
parameters (such as reaction rate constants or binary interaction coefficients) are fixed 
over the course of simulations, but perturbations over small ranges can yield rare-event 
trajectories.  Non-parametric noise, introduced in a well-scaled term added to a process 
unit balance equation, can yield physical interactions not in the first-principles model – 
such as a side reaction or leak in a vessel.  Careful formulation of these terms can 
improve the effectiveness of non-parametric noise in predicting plant shutdowns and 
accidents.  
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Figure 4.2. TPS used to generate a trial rare-event trajectory from an initial 
trajectory. 
 
Also, when applying TPS, unlikely rare-event trajectories are often generated easily using 
process models.  But, careful analysis is helpful in generating initial trajectories that 
enable TPS to discover serious unpostulated plant shutdowns and accidents. 
The outline of the TPS algorithm is shown in Table 4.1.  The random perturbation 
of rare-event trajectories may lead to the development of new rare-event trajectories, as 
shown by Figure 4.2b.  When this new trajectory is accepted  further iterations take place 
from this trajectory.  If the new trajectory is not a rare-event trajectory, or the new 
trajectory is an unaccepted rare-event, further iterations take place from the previous 
trajectory.  The random nature of TPS allows for interesting, possibly unpostulated, rare-
event trajectories to be identified.  Additionally, by simulating many trajectories of 
postulated interlock-activating events, engineers and operators can gain a more 
quantitative understanding of such events. 
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Table 4.1. TPS Algorithm 
 
1. Identify an initial safety event trajectory 
2. Choose a random time, t', along the trajectory 
3. At t', perturb state variables, x, to x’ and stochastic variables,  , to    
4. Integrate forward from t' to tf, and backwards from t' to 0 
5. Determine if this trial trajectory identifies a safety-event 
6. If yes, consider accepting the trial safety event trajectory as the new 
trajectory, where the trajectory acceptance criteria are defined in Figure 4.5.   
7. Return to step 2. 
 
 
4.2.1. Backward Integration 
 
 An important difference between TPS in molecular and process dynamics is the 
backward integration approach.  In molecular dynamics, force balances, 
 
 
    
   
          (4.1) 
 
are solved, which are second-order ordinary differential equations (ODEs), noting that    
is the position of atom  , and        are the forces exhibited on atom   by all other atoms.  
At   , when backward integration is initiated, the initial conditions are     
   and 
   
  
    .  
For backward integration, the sign of the first derivative is reversed, –
   
  
     , to enable a 
stable forward integration to    .   However, in process dynamics, typical systems are 
first-order ODEs, taking the form: 
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             (4.2) 
 
where   is a vector of state variables (e.g., moles or energy),   is a vector of stochastic 
variables, and   is a vector of input variables (e.g., feed conditions).  The same approach 
for backward integration in molecular dynamics is not applicable.  If the signs of the 
time-derivative terms were reversed: 
 
      
   
  
          ,    (4.3) 
 
the resulting Jacobian matrices of f, for typical process systems, would have large 
positive eigenvalues.  Even with linear multi-step integrators (e.g., backward-difference 
formulae), numerically unstable solutions would be obtained that are often chaotic.  
Because the resulting trajectories are usually inaccurate, a boundary-value optimization is 
often formulated, as discussed next.   
In one approach, initial conditions in the vector,   , are manipulated such that when 
integration proceeds along [    ], the state variables at   ,       , approach the desired 
state variables at   ,   .  Said differently, the backward-integration step is performed by 
solving: 
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              (4.4) 
            
 
   
 
  
          
         
 
In this approach, a shooting method (Bock et al., 2000) is used as illustrated in Figure 
4.3.  Here,      is the initial guess for   .  After forward integration to   ,   
      is 
substantially less than   .  To compensate, a larger guess,       is chosen, yielding   
        
      is too large.  The next guess value,     , yields   
       which is sufficiently close 
to   .  This optimization effectively performs the function of backward integration.  When 
the initial value lies within the typical operation region, a rare-event trajectory has been 
located.  If not, this trial trajectory is discarded and a new    and    are chosen from the 
previous trajectory. 
 
  
Figure 4.3. Boundary-value optimization to indirectly perform backward 
integration using initial-value shooting. 
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In perhaps a more common approach, used herein, the optimization is formulated using 
orthogonal collocation on finite elements (Cuthrell et al., 1989).  This technique involves 
introducing xi
K
(t), a K-order polynomial approximation of x over the time range,   
         , with N finite elements spanning the total time range [0, t’].  Each xi
K
(t) is 
constructed using K + 1 interpolations of               , where   is a normalized time 
spanning          .    The minimization problem: 
        
              (4.5) 
           
        
       
    
       
                
       
   
    
  
                           
          
     
 
is solved for x0.  Similar to the shooting method, x0 is the initial condition that places x(t) 
close to x’at t = t’.  The orthogonal collocation method is summarized in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4. Orthogonal collocation over finite-elements. 
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4.2.2. Trajectory Likelihood Calculation  
 
Another key difference between the two TPS formulations involves the estimation of 
trajectory likelihood in Step 6, Table 4.1.  In molecular dynamics, the likelihood of a 
trajectory is simply the product of Boltzmann factors corresponding to the atomic 
configurations at each time step.  In process dynamics, likelihood probabilities rely on 
available or simulated process data.  The likelihood probability,  , is often calculated 
using: 
 
                                 
  
     (4.6) 
 
where      , a binary variable, is unity when      lies within normal operation 
conditions (green-belt zone) at    ,       , a binary variable, is unity when       
satisfies the criteria of unsafe or unreliable conditions (red-belt zone) at     ,       is 
the likelihood of the initial conditions,        are the stochastic variables at time   , 
         is the likelihood of stochastic variables at time   , and   is the number of 
stochastic samples taken along [    ] 8,9.   The likelihood of initial conditions can be 
estimated using process data, with       increasing as the population of x0 increases.  In 
large part, stochastic variables are related to noise (parametric or non-parametric), often 
expressed as probability distributions (commonly, normal distributions).  In these cases, 
         are simply the likelihood of noise   at time,   .  When   is a normal distribution 
with mean 0 and variance,   : 
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     (4.7) 
 
Note that when these likelihood probabilities are very small, they are often expressed on 
a log scale. 
 
4.2.3. Full TPS Algorithm 
 
 The full TPS algorithm for sampling process safety-events is shown in Figure 4.5, 
with the three phases: generating an initial trajectory, generating N unique trajectories, 
and grouping the N trajectories into k clusters.  The algorithm begins with counters     
and    , an initial trajectory, x1(0,…,tf), and its associated likelihood  , calculated 
using Eq. (6).  At time t’, the x1(t’) trajectory is perturbed using normal distributions to 
develop the state x’.  The boundary-value problem in Eq. (4) is solved to obtain   , which 
is then integrated over [0,tf] to obtain the trial trajectory,           .  The likelihood of 
this trajectory,   , is calculated using Eq. (6).  A random number, r, in the range [0,1] is 
sampled; when less than 
  
 
,the trial trajectory is rejected, otherwise, it is accepted.  If 
           is accepted, i = i + 1,      , x
i(0,…,tf) =           , and p = p’.  If 
           is rejected, i = i + 1 and x
i(0,…,tf) =             .  When N unique 
trajectories have been calculated (    , they are grouped into k = 2 clusters using the 
k-means clustering technique
 
(Hartigan et al., 1979).   The Euclidean distance, s, is 
calculated between all pairs of centroids (the center of each cluster) and if the distance 
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between the closest pair is greater than 5% of the distance between the furthest pair, k is 
increased by one and new centroids are calculated.  Eventually, the additional new cluster 
will be sufficiently close to an existing cluster, and the loop will be terminated.    
r < p’/p  ’
Generate an initial 
trajectory, 
xi(0,…,tf)
Sample 
t’ ~ uniform[0,tf]
Integrate
dx*/dt = f(x*,η ,u); x*(0) = x0
Over the range [0,tf]
Sample
 r ~ uniform(0,1)
i = i + 1
j = j +1
p = hA(0) ⨯ hB(tf) ⨯ f0(x
i(0)) ⨯ 
Π(g(η(ti))) 
i = 1
j = 1
Sample 
x’ ~ normal(xi(t’),σ2)
η' ~ normal(η,σ2) 
Solve for x0:
min (x’ - x*(t’))2
dx*/dt = f(x*,η ,u)
x*(0) = x0
p’ = hA
*(0) ⨯ hB
*(tf) ⨯ f0(x0) ⨯ 
Π(g(η(ti))) 
Begin
xi(0,…,tf) = 
x*(0,…,tf)
p = p’
η = η’ 
j = Nj  
YesNo
No
k = 2
Group N trajectories into 
k clusters, each cluster 
having centroid 
Cp,k ; p ϵ {1,…,k}
Yes
Generate Initial 
Trajectory
Generate N
Trajectories
Group N 
Trajectories into k 
Clusters
Calculate all combinations:  
  , , =   𝑐 ,  𝑐 ,  
2
     
∀    1,  ,   ;    { + 1,  ,  } 
min{sp,q,k} > 0.05⨯max{sp,q,k}i { , ,k}  . { , ,k}
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End
k = k+1
Yes
No
i = i + 1
xi(0,…,tf) = 
xi-1(0,…,tf)
 
Figure 4.5. TPS algorithm for calculating trajectories of process safety-events. 
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4.3. Exothermic CSTR Example 
 
The TPS algorithm is demonstrated using a familiar example – that of the 
exothermic CSTR.  With only two differential balance equations, a heat and material 
balance, and PI-control, this example has the benefit of being low-dimensional.  The 
existence of multiple (high- and low-conversion) stable steady-states (Balakotaiah et al., 
1983), and in particular, the infrequent transitions between them, provide an excellent 
example of the potential of using TPS to study rare, yet important, safety-events. 
Consider a model for the jacketed exothermic CSTR with reaction:  
 
         ,     (4.8) 
 
a schematic of which is shown in Figure 4.6.  The temperature and inlet concentration of 
A are   ,     , and the outlet temperature and concentration of A,     , are calculated as a 
function of time.  The reactor is assumed to have perfect level control, with equal inlet 
and outlet volumetric flow rates,  .  The cooling jacket is assumed to be sufficiently 
large such that the temperature change of the cooling fluid,   , is negligible.  The reaction 
has elementary kinetics and an Arrhenius rate constant; i.e., 
 
             
  
  
        (4.9) 
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where   is the intrinsic reaction rate,    is the pre-exponential factor,    is the activation 
energy, and   is the gas constant.  The derivatives of    and   with respect to time,  , 
are: 
 
    
   
  
 
 
 
                  
  
  
      (4.10a) 
      
  
  
 
    
 
                          
  
  
    (4.10b) 
 
where   is the residence time,   is the overall heat-transfer coefficient,  is the area for 
heat transfer,   is the reactor volume,   is the density,    is the heat capacity, and    is 
the heat of reaction.  Typical parameters are listed in Table 4.2. 
 
F, Tf, CA,f  
F, T, CA
Tc
Tc
A → P
 
Figure 4.6. Schematic of the exothermic CSTR. 
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Table 4.2. Parameters for the dynamic CSTR model 
Parameter Value Unit 
A 30 m
2
 
CA,f 2 kmol/m
3
 
Cp 4 kJ/(kg-K) 
Ea 1.50E+04 kJ/kmol 
k0 1.7038 1/min 
R 8.314 kJ/(kmol-K) 
Tc 300 K 
Tf 300 K 
U 100 kJ/(min-K-m
2
) 
V 10 m
3
 
 H 2.20E+05 kJ/kmol 
ρ 1,000 kg/m3 
τ 0.5 min 
Kc -0.02 min/K 
τI 0.05 min 
 
This reactor exhibits S-shaped dependences of conversion and temperature on residence 
time, as shown in Figure 4.7a,b.  Consider that it is desired to operate along the high-
conversion branch, but at lower temperature, 800K, for safety reasons, with a residence 
time of 0.5 minutes, having a conversion of 0.5 and a temperature of 800K.   
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Figure 4.7. Conversion in the exothermic CSTR. 
 
It is important to understand the mechanisms by which the CSTR can move from 
operation on the high- to the low-conversion branch.  From a reliability perspective, this 
CSTR would likely be shutdown when it moves to the low-conversion branch, especially 
considering that ignition to the high-conversion branch during operation may pose safety 
risks (e.g., large overshoot that is difficult to avoid).  To move from the high- to low-
conversion branch, non-parametric noise is introduced to each of the two balance 
equations.   
 
   
   
  
 
 
 
                  
  
  
    
   
 
   (4.11a) 
     
  
  
 
    
 
                          
  
  
    
      
 
 
 (4.11b) 
 
Each   is sampled every minute (       ) from an independent normal distribution 
with mean 0 and variance,   
 .  The non-parametric noise terms in Eq. (11) must be 
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scaled carefully to predict plant shutdowns and accidents.  Each noise term was scaled to 
represent noise in convective flux – the noise introduced to each equation is of the same 
order of magnitude as fluctuations in feed material or energy.  These terms are scaled to 
yield either noise in convective flux or unpostulated safety events arising from 
phenomena having similar magnitudes to convective noise; possibly modest side-
reactions or water leaks.  When      (i.e.,    is sampled from a delta function centered 
at zero,     ) at all times, with   
      , the dynamic trajectory over an hour is 
shown in Figure 4.8a.  However, when the variance is increased to   
     , the system 
moves to its low-conversion region, as shown in Figure 4.8b.  These figures motivate 
control for the CSTR – a relatively modest noise drives the system to its low-conversion 
region, and for very small noise, the temperature still fluctuates over a 50K range.  Note 
that parametric noise could have been introduced to a parameter appearing in both 
balances, such as  , by modifying        , where    is the original choice for   
(listed in Table 4.2). 
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Figure 4.8. Effect of introducing noise to an uncontrolled CSTR. 
 99 
 
 
In typical operation, PI-control is used to maintain the reactor in its high-conversion 
region.  Herein, the residence time is manipulated to maintain the temperature at 800K: 
 
   
   
  
 
 
 
                  
  
  
    
   
 
   (4.12a) 
     
  
  
 
    
 
                          
  
  
    
      
 
 
 (4.12b) 
    
   
  
            (4.12c) 
               
  
  
      (4.12d) 
 
where     is the temperature setpoint,    is the controller gain,    is the integral of the 
error, and    is the integral time constant, shown in Table 4.2.  With control, the noise 
term has far less impact, as shown in Figure 4.9.   
While control makes moving to the low-conversion region far less likely, it remains a 
plausible rare event with safety implications.  In other words, even with control, a noise 
pattern can move the reactor to its low-conversion region.  Using TPS, rare paths from 
the high- to the low-conversion regions are shown next.   
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Figure 4.9. Effect of introducing noise to a controlled CSTR. 
 
 
 
4.3.1. TPS to Generate Rare-Event Trajectories 
 
As shown in the TPS algorithm in Table 4.1, an initial rare-event trajectory must 
be generated.  Such a low-likelihood trajectory can be generated by prescribing the noise, 
  , to take a high magnitude over the full hour trajectory.  An initial trajectory is 
generated by setting    = -1.5 at each sampling interval (one minute), and setting     .  
The trajectory begins at steady-state.  As the temperature initially decreases, with less 
reactant available, the PI-controller increases the residence time, increasing the 
conversion of the reaction and generating more heat.  The trajectory is shown below in 
Figure 4.10.  With the system at a low concentration of A and a temperature below the 
setpoint (800K), the PI-controller continues to increase the residence time, but the 
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reaction heat release is offset by the cooling jacket.  Said differently, at the end state of 
this trajectory, the PI-controller is incapable of returning the reactor to the desired high-
conversion region.  Subsequently, the region of rare-safety events is initially demarked by 
regions in the ranges:  
 
                                        
    (4.13) 
 
and final conditions bounded by: 
 
                                
     (4.14) 
 
time
 
Figure 4.10. Initial rare-event trajectory. 
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 From this initial trajectory, the TPS technique generates more trajectories – 
specifically, those having higher likelihoods (i.e., less noise).  At random time,   , 
perturbations are made to the state variables,  ,   , and   , and the stochastic variables; 
  , and   .  These are sampled from normal distributions: 
                     (4.15a)  
     
        
              (4.15b) 
     
        
           (4.15c) 
     
                (4.15d) 
     
                (4.15e) 
 
Given sampling distributions for the perturbations, the likelihood distributions       and 
         are needed.  A simple, uniform likelihood distribution for the initial conditions 
is used, with all trajectories that meet the initial rare-event criteria (Eqs. (12) and (13)) 
equally likely; i.e.,    
 
            
 
         ⨯         
   (4.16) 
 
The likelihoods of the noise variables are: 
 
                    (4.17a)  
                   (4.17b) 
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With these distributions established, the TPS methodology iteratively generates many 
random rare-event trajectories.  In Figure 4.11, a few such trajectories are illustrated. 
 In the TPS algorithm, the length of the trajectory,   , must be specified a priori. 
Both    and the sampling interval,   , for stochastic variables,    and   , must be selected 
carefully.  When    is too long, trajectories reside in either the high- or low-conversion 
regions too long – rather than moving from region-to-region in transition; i.e., along 
pathways of interest.  Figure 4.12 shows a poor choice for   , where the reactor moves too 
quickly to the low-conversion region; i.e., low-temperature region.  In this case,    was 
set at 24 hr.  But, when    is too small, the low-conversion region is not reached; i.e., no 
rare-event trajectories are computed.   
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time
time
time
 
 
Figure 4.11. Rare-event trajectories generated using TPS. 
 
time
 
Figure 4.12.  Example of a simulation that is too long. 
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 The stochastic sampling time is especially crucial when control is implemented.  
Here, the PI-controller moves toward a steady-state, at its setpoint, in the face of 
disturbances.  When effective, in response to    and    noise, the reactor equilibrates at 
its desired steady-state.  But, after equilibration, backward integration cannot be restarted.  
Consequently, when responding to stochastic noise, sampling intervals must be smaller 
than controlled reactor response times; i.e., when sufficiently small noise sampling 
intervals are used, dynamic behavior is achieved.  Note that more effective controllers 
require shorter noise sampling time intervals.  For this example, a sampling time of one 
minute is sufficiently short. 
 The TPS strategy continually yields trajectories having probabilities greater than 
or of similar magnitude to the probabilities of the previous trajectory (Step 6 in Table 
4.1).  The TPS algorithm was run for N = 100,000.  The likelihood probabilities,  , of the 
first 350 unique trajectories are shown in Figure 4.13, in sequence.  From the least-likely 
initial trajectory, the sampling strategy moves towards more likely trajectories.  These 
probabilities, of course, remain small as they represent the most likely of rare safety-
events – and the first 150 are rejected as atypical.   
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 Figure 4.13.  First 350 TPS trajectories. 
 
As the trajectories are generated, it is desirable to cluster them to better understand the 
transitions between the high- and low-conversion states.  In Figure 4.14, the time-
averaged noise,   , is displayed as a function of the time-averaged noise,   , noting that 
each data point represents a single trajectory, with each time-averaged noise: 
 
        
 
  
       
  
 
    (4.18) 
 
As shown, there are two distinct clusters of trajectories, A and B, which are identified 
using the k-means clustering technique (Hartigan et al., 1979).  Here, each trajectory is 
clustered about one of the centroids, the centers-of-mass of the clusters.  Using this 
strategy, two distinct paths to the safety-event have been identified.  While other clusters 
may not have been identified, these two clusters of likely trajectories are excellent 
candidates for protection in the form of reliability and safety systems.    
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Figure 4.14. The trajectories displayed in two clusters.   
 
 Figure 4.15 shows the natural log of trajectory likelihood for 100,000 unique 
trajectories, with values displayed for trajectories 201, 301, 501, …, in sequence.  Note: 
the first 200 trajectories are atypical and not displayed.  Initially, Cluster A is populated, 
involving data for approximately 20,000 trajectories, having likelihoods near       
    .  Eventually, the trajectories move towards the bridge between the two clusters, 
with those in Cluster B displayed, having likelihoods near           .  When the TPS 
algorithm samples from within a cluster, it tends to yield trajectories within the cluster.  
However, some perturbations allow the algorithm to move from one cluster to the other.  
The movements between clusters are possible when sampling occurs from sections close 
to the other cluster – permitting transfers to occur with just small perturbations.  In fact, a 
third Cluster C may exist, which is not populated because it lies too far from Clusters A 
and B.   
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 Figure 4.15. Trajectory likelihood in sequence. 
 
When larger perturbations are allowed, the movement between clusters is more frequent 
– occurring across larger distances.  Let the variances of the perturbations include a factor 
   
 
                      (4.19a)  
     
        
              (4.19b) 
     
        
            (4.19c) 
     
                 (4.19d) 
     
                (4.19e) 
 
When the TPS algorithm is run, starting with the same initial trajectory, the number of 
movements between the clusters are shown as a function of   in Figure 4.16.  The greater 
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the perturbation variance, the more movements between clusters.  It should be noted that 
even when    , only Clusters A and B were populated (i.e., Cluster C was not 
discovered).  But, even larger   may yield Cluster C – with significantly longer 
computation times.  Alternatively, starting from a number of very different initial 
trajectories may be a fruitful avenue for discovering new trajectory clusters, because with 
larger perturbations, the trajectories are less likely to satisfy the rare safety-event criteria 
(i.e.,                , or the acceptance criteria.  Figure 4.17 shows that as   
increases, the probabilities of acceptance decrease significantly.  While     allows for 
25 movements between Clusters A and B, on the order of 1,000,000 trial trajectories are 
generated to capture 100,000 unique trajectories.  
Clearly, the number of trial trajectories to yield a new, uncorrelated trajectory is 
sensitive to the choice of  .  While small   yields a high probability of acceptance, as 
shown in Figure 4.17, the accepted trajectories are quite similar to the original trajectories 
– and many trajectories must be accepted before a new, uncorrelated trajectory is 
generated.   
The autocorrelation function quantifies the correlation between trajectories   
iterations apart.  As follows, a       is determined to locate sufficiently different 
trajectories.  First, a midpoint for the respective trajectories is selected.  For the CSTR 
process, within the green-belt and red-belt zones, temperatures and concentrations differ 
significantly, whereas in the yellow-belt zone, temperatures and concentrations follow 
similar paths.  A midpoint is selected at         [(750 + 790)/2] – the temperature 
midpoint between the high and low conversion regions (see Eqs. (12, 13)).  Note that for 
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a trajectory  , the     trajectory is similar at its midpoint, the     trajectory is less 
similar, and so on.  As the iteration distance   increases, the midpoint of trajectory     
becomes less similar to the midpoint of trajectory  .  The autocorrelation function 
averages the correlation between the midpoints of trajectory   and     over all 
trajectories
 
(Gelman et al., 2014).  The autocorrelation function is: 
 
         
      
    
      
      
   
  
  
   (4.20) 
 
where      is the autocorrelation value at  iteration distance,   is the expected value 
function,    
  is the concentration of trajectory   at   ,   
  and   
   are the mean and 
variance of the midpoint concentration amongst trajectories in the cluster associated with 
iteration i, respectively.  A critical iteration distance,      , is defined as the smallest   for 
which  
 
                      (4.21) 
 
noting that the autocorrelation function has the properties: 
 
                              (4.22) 
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Figure 4.18 shows       as a function of   noting that the minimum,       is the most 
efficient computational choice. 
 
 
Figure 4.16. Number of movements between clusters as a function of perturbation 
size. 
 
Figure 4.17.  Probability of accepting trajectories as a function of perturbation size. 
 
 112 
 
 
Figure 4.18.       as a function of  . 
 
 With the two clusters identified, an opportunity exists to better understand each 
cluster.  In Figure 4.19, the concentration of A is displayed as a function of temperature 
for 1,000 random trajectories associated with Cluster B.  All trajectories fit the same 
pattern, which can be helpful in creating an alarm.  Movement in this pattern suggests 
that a reliability or safety-event is impending.  Such an alarm could alert operators in time 
to prevent such an event.  This is a very powerful use for TPS – reliability and safety 
systems can be aided by the quantitative simulation analysis to mitigate rare safety events 
more frequently. 
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Figure 4.19. Concentration of A as function of temperature for all trajectories in 
Cluster B. 
 
4.4. Air Separation Unit (ASU) Example 
 
 The exothermic CSTR example involves just two state variables in a simple, 
familiar model to demonstrate the TPS method and its associated challenges and 
opportunities.  But, industrial application of TPS is likely to involve significantly more 
complex processes.  In this example, TPS is applied to an ASU model, having 480 state 
variables.  This model uses a modified version of a process flow diagram proposed by the 
NETL (“Commercial Technologies for Oxygen Production”), and uses mathematical 
formulae proposed by Huang et al.
 
(Huang et al., 2009)  Because the process operates at 
cryogenic conditions, it has many heat recycle loops.  These loops create complex 
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process interactions, some of which may propagate to rare safety and reliability events.  
The power of TPS is demonstrated in this example – with events that occur due to 
process-scale interactions captured and better understood, as compared with events that 
arise just due to unit operation disturbances and failures. 
 Pretreated air (stream 1) is separated into product liquid oxygen (LOX – stream 
23), gaseous oxygen (GOX – stream 22), liquid nitrogen (LIN – stream 12), gaseous 
nitrogen (GAN – stream 14), and liquid argon (LAR – stream 20).  Its pretreatment 
involves removing water, carbon dioxide, methane, and cooling to saturated vapor and 
saturated liquid feed streams with only oxygen, argon, and nitrogen present (in order of 
increasing volatility).  In this example, three distillation columns are used – a high-
pressure column (HPC) at 5.5 bar beneath a low-pressure column (LPC) at 1.25 bar, with 
a crude argon column (CAR) taking a sidedraw (stream 18) from the LPC, as shown in 
Figure 4.20.  At these pressures, the columns operate cryogenically at temperatures on the 
order of 85K.  The HPC vapor overhead (stream 8) is condensed by vaporizing the LPC 
bottoms liquid, and the CAR vapor overhead (stream 18) is condensed by vaporizing the 
HPC bottoms liquid (stream 5, cooled to stream 6).  As streams leave the HPC and 
expand from 5.5 bar to 1.25 bar, they are cooled by GAN (stream 14) and waste nitrogen 
(stream 15) to maintain saturated liquids at the same temperature.  The HPC and CAR 
has 40 trays, and the LPC has 80 trays.  The feed and side-draw locations were chosen to 
provide products having impurities <1 mol%, as specified in the Huang et al. (Huang et 
al., 2009) ASU model.   
The trays in each column are modeled at equilibrium using the MESH (mass 
balance, phase equilibrium, summation of mole fractions, and heat balance) equations, an 
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empirical equation relating the liquid holdup to the liquid flow rate, and the Peng-
Robinson equation of state
17
.  This model is modified from the Huang et al. (Huang et al., 
2009) for model-predictive control.  The overall material balance of tray   is represented 
by:   
 
 
 
  
                          (4.23) 
 
where    is the liquid molar holdup,  is the liquid molar flow rate,  is the vapor molar 
flow rate, and    is the molar feed flow rate (zero for most trays).  It should be noted that 
only the liquid holdup is considered here – the vapor, being far less dense, has a 
negligible holdup.  The component material balances describe the composition of each 
tray, and are shown in: 
 
 
  
                                                     ∀                (4.24) 
 
where   is the liquid molar fraction,   is the vapor molar fraction, and   is the feed molar 
fraction (phase unspecified).  The heat balance is: 
 
  
 
  
     
       
          
        
      
      
       (25) 
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where    is the liquid molar enthalpy,    is the vapor molar enthalpy, and    is the feed 
molar enthalpy (phase unspecified).  An empirical relationship for the liquid flow rate as 
a function of the liquid molar holdup is assumed: 
 
                 (4.26) 
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Figure 4.20.  Air Separation Unit process flow diagram. 
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where    was specified by Huang et al. (Huang et al., 2009) at 0.5 min
-1
.  The vapor-
liquid equilibrium in each tray is modeled by equating the mixture fugacities of the 
species in the vapor and liquid phases: 
 
         
          
         (4.27) 
 
where     
  is the liquid fugacity coefficient of species j on tray i, and     
  is the vapor 
fugacity coefficient of species j on tray i, each calculated using the Peng-Robinson 
equation of state, at the tray temperature,   , the column pressure, and the mole fractions 
of the associated phases.  The enthalpies are also calculated using the equation of state as 
described by Peng and Robinson
 
(Peng et al., 1976).  Lastly, the mole fractions sum to 
unity in the vapor on each tray: 
 
                  (4.28) 
 
 The feed air is assumed to have a constant composition (78% nitrogen, 21% 
oxygen, 1% argon).  Its flow rate, Fair, is determined by the product demand of each 
product i, di: 
 
          
         
    
 
         
    
 
    
    
     (4.29) 
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There are six more operation decision variables, β1 through β6: the LIN split fraction fed 
to the subcooler, the LIN split fraction fed to the LPC, the LAR split fraction to the CAR 
reflux, the side-draw split fraction of waste nitrogen, the side-draw fraction of crude 
argon, and the side-draw fraction of GOX.  These decision variables are manipulated 
using PID controllers to maintain the six set points, α1 through α6: N2 mole fraction of 
GAN, N2 mole fraction of LIN, O2 mole fraction of GOX, O2 mole fraction of LAR, ratio 
of GAN to LIN, and ratio of GOX to LOX.  Note, the O2 mole fraction of LAR is 
controlled, rather than the Ar mole fraction, because a fourth column normally handles 
the Ar-N2 separation in industry – not included herein to reduce the computational load.  
The set points and α-β pairs are shown in Table 4.3. 
 
4.4.1. TPS Process-Scale Demonstration 
 
 To demonstrate TPS, at least one rare-event must be identified.  The rare events of 
interest for this example involve the nitrogen mole fraction in the LAR stream 20,    
   .  
In this model, the LAR typically contains on the order of 0.001 mole fraction nitrogen.  
As its nitrogen content increases, its condensation load increases – with the rich liquid 
oxygen stream (6) increasingly vaporized.  The effluent liquid oxygen (stream 7), a feed 
to the LPC (on tray 30 – typically the largest feed stream), is crucial to the operation of 
the column, and as it becomes increasingly vaporized, α3, dGOX, and dLOX may not be met.  
Additionally, as more nitrogen is introduced to the LAR, a greater burden is placed on the 
column responsible for the N2-Ar separation before the argon product can be sold 
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(column not modeled).  When the nitrogen fraction in the LAR exceeds a critical level, 
the process typically undergoes a shutdown (reliability-event), which has the potential to 
become a safety-event (as shutdown and restart can provide more challenges).  Therefore, 
the rare-event is defined by: 
            
                     
          (4.30) 
 
Table 4.3.  Control logic of the ASU Model. 
Controlled Variable Manipulated Variable Set point 
α1 (N2 mole fraction of GAN) β4 (side-draw fraction  
of waste nitrogen) 
0.995 
α2 (N2 mole fraction of LIN) β1 (LIN split fraction  
to subcooler) 
0.995 
α3 (O2 mole fraction of GOX) β5 (side-draw fraction  
of crude argon) 
0.985 
α4 (Ar mole fraction of LAR) β3 (LAR split fraction  
to CAR) 
0.99 
α5 (ratio of GAN to LIN) β2 (LIN split fraction  
to LPC) 
dGAN/dLIN 
α6 (ratio of GOX to LOX) β6 (side-draw fraction  
of GOX) 
dGOX/dLOX 
 
 
 An initial rare-event trajectory begins with little nitrogen in the CAR column – 
thus, there is little nitrogen entering the column from the LPC in stream 16.  The vapor 
mole fraction profile along the LPC is shown in Figure 4.21a at the start of this trajectory 
– notice that the argon composition peaks close to tray 39, the tray whose vapor sidedraw 
is fed to the CAR column, while the nitrogen fraction is sufficiently low.  At the 
beginning of this trajectory, overly aggressive set points (which are described by the set 
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point likelihood, described later) for the production rate of LOX and LAR are simulated.  
With large amounts of vapor from the bottom of the LPC column, liquid higher in the 
column vaporizes to replace it, and the argon bubble begins dropping along the column.  
The mole fraction profiles at 1-, 4-, and 12-hr are shown in Figures 4.21b, 4.21c, and 
4.21d, respectively.  As the nitrogen enters the CAR, it rises into the LAR product, whose 
nitrogen mole fraction along the trajectory is shown in Figure 4.21e.  This trajectory, 
which satisfied the criteria in Eq. (30), represents a rare-event trajectory. 
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a) b)
c) d)
e)
Figure 4.21.  Mole fraction profiles after 
LOX and LAR setpoints are increased: (a) 
initial profiles, (b) 1-hr, (c) 4- hr, (d) 12-
hr.  (e) The initial safety-event trajectory 
is displayed, with nearly 2% nitrogen in 
the final LAR product at tf.
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 From this initial trajectory, perturbations are made to each state variable,     
  , 
      
  , and       
  .  The perturbations to liquid mole fractions are particularly 
challenging – in regions where species j mole fractions,     , are near zero or unity, only 
small perturbations can be handled (that is, large perturbations may not allow the system 
of equations to be solved).  However, in regions where      are near 0.5, much larger 
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perturbations can be handled.  Therefore, the variances of the perturbations are scaled by 
factors     (1-     .  The stochastic variables in the model are the demand of each product, 
di, sampled at each half-hour (with 48 samples over the day-long trajectory).  The 
perturbations are sampled from normal distributions with mean and variance in 
parentheses: 
 
       
         
                    (4.31a) 
         
           
         
             
          (4.31b) 
         
           
         
             
          (4.31c) 
       
         
                    (4.31d) 
 
 The other important user-defined function is the likelihood of each trajectory, p.  
The density of initial conditions,       , is calculated using computational data, collected 
from a 100-day run of the system with    sampled at 30 minute intervals: 
 
    
                    
          (4.32) 
 
where     are shown in Table 4.4.  A multivariate normal distribution, having 480 
dimensions (one for each state variable) is constructed from this data, and is used as   .  
Two dimensions (oxygen and argon purity of the LPC sump and CAR condenser, 
respectively) of this distribution are shown in Figure 4.22. 
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Table 4.4. Product Demand for this Simulated Example. 
Product 
Demand Load 
[kmol/day] 
GAN 20,000 
LIN 20,000 
GOX 10,000 
LOX 10,000 
LAR 500 
 
 
 
Figure 4.22. Initial condition simulated data. 
 
The likelihood of the product demand at each sampling interval is calculated by: 
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        (4.33) 
 
Having defined all factors in Eq. (6), the likelihoods of the trajectories for this example 
are calculated. 
 With an initial trajectory, a sampling distribution for perturbing the state variables 
at t’, and a trajectory likelihood function, the TPS algorithm is run to investigate the rare-
event.  Because the boundary-value problem and integration of the model equations are 
more computationally taxing than for the CSTR example, N is reduced to 5,000.  When 
this algorithm is executed, the trajectories move into one of two clusters.  Said 
differently, two clusters (at least) of trajectories are identified, but trajectories are not 
observed to move between the clusters as in the CSTR example.  The clusters are shown 
in Figure 4.23, with trajectories 50, 100, 150, …, 5,000, displayed.  Here, cluster A 
contains trajectories that have a high average demand for LOX, whereas Cluster B is 
occupied by trajectories having a high average demand for LAR.  For the trajectories in 
Cluster A, as LOX is withdrawn from the LPC, more N2 is drawn into its lower trays and 
the waste nitrogen withdrawn is reduced   Consequently, the crude argon sidedraw 
(stream 16) becomes increasingly concentrated in nitrogen, and as nitrogen enters the 
CAR column, the rare-event is realized.  For the trajectories in Cluster B, a similar effect 
occurs where more material from the top of the column (typically N2 rich) is drawn to the 
crude argon sidedraw.  With more LAR production, the rich liquid stream has a higher 
condensing duty, with the rich liquid stream increasingly vaporized, resulting in more 
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oxygen leaving through the waste nitrogen stream.  Liquid nitrogen, from the LIN reflux, 
drops into the middle trays in the LPC to replace liquid oxygen, the crude argon stream 
becomes increasingly concentrated with nitrogen, and the rare-event trajectory is realized.   
 
Clearly, rare-events occur when either LOX or LAR contain overdrawn nitrogen.   
The two nitrogen accumulations do not occur together in the rare events observed.  Also, 
as shown in Figure 4.24, the sequence of TPS trajectories does not show movement 
between the two clusters in Figure 4.23 as the trajectories are generated.   
 
 
Figure 4.23. Clusters of rare-event trajectories. 
 
 127 
 
 
Figure 4.24. Likelihood of rare-event trajectories in succession. 
 
4.5. Conclusions   
 While rare molecular dynamics events have been studied using TPS methods, this 
paper extends the techniques to apply to process dynamics in the study of rare product 
reliability and safety events.  For process dynamics, a boundary-value problem is solved 
in lieu of performing backwards integration, and the likelihoods of trajectories are 
formulated.  Two boundary-value solution methods, shooting (Bock et al., 2000) and 
orthogonal collocation (Cuthrell et al., 1989), are investigated.  While both are sufficient 
for the CSTR process, the orthogonal collocation method is much better suited to handle 
the larger ASU process model.  Other sampling algorithms, such as forward-flux 
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sampling (Escobedo et al., 2009) or milestoning
 
(Kuczera et al., 2009), do not require 
backwards integration, and may prove to be effective in understanding rare-event 
trajectories as well.  The likelihood distributions are formed using simulated data, with 
the incorporation of process data to be investigated in the future.  For the exothermic 
CSTR, two clusters of trajectories are generated by the TPS technique.  For an ASU 
process model, having far more variables and process interactions, two separate clusters 
of trajectories are generated.  In both examples, the discovery of two clusters was not 
expected – demonstrating that TPS can yield unanticipated rare-event trajectories.  
Possibly most interesting is the separation of clusters when applied to the ASU process.  
Because the clusters are sufficiently far apart, this indicates that in the operation of this 
ASU model, the LOX and LAR demand rate changes can be considered separately.  Said 
differently, reaching the upper limit of acceptable LOX draw should not influence the 
upper limit of acceptable LAR draw.  This sampling strategy benefits from the 
randomness in state variable perturbations and trajectory acceptances, allowing clusters 
of rare-event trajectories to be better understood and for the potential discovery of 
unanticipated trajectories.   
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
5.1 Summary 
 This thesis has presented two methods, the generation of informed prior 
distributions (IPD) and transition path sampling (TPS), for predicting the failure 
probabilities of rarely activated alarm and safety systems.  These are difficult to estimate 
using classical statistical approaches.  Commonly, an alarm or safety system is activated 
just a handful of times, on the order of one to ten, over the lifetime of a process, yielding 
confidence intervals too large to allow meaningful design or operational decisions.  
Research on dynamic risk analysis, using copulas, reduced the variance of their 
predictions (Meel et al., 2006; Pariyani et al., 2012b).  However, even using the most 
advanced statistical techniques, their variances depend upon the amount of data collected.  
Alarm and safety systems are vital to the proper operation of a chemical process, and 
meaningful estimates of their failure probabilities are extremely useful, even in the design 
and commissioning phase (when few data are available), or over the lifetime of the 
process despite relatively few data points where alarm and safety interlock systems 
activate. 
Chapter 2 describes the IPD technique, which estimates failure probabilities of 
alarms rarely activated.  In Chapter 3, operator behavior models are introduced, 
enhancing the predictions calculated using IPDs.  Large amounts of L- and H-alarm data, 
resulting from more frequent, less severe, special-cause events, are systematically applied 
to improve the predictions resulting from less frequent, more severe special-cause events.  
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When applied to a SMR process, this methodology is shown to provide more reliable 
failure probability estimates. 
The second method, TPS, developed initially by the molecular simulation community, 
has been modified and applied to study rare process dynamic events.  Similar to IPDs, the 
probabilities of “trajectories” leading to alarm and safety system failures are estimated.  
With this method, many trajectories are calculated using random perturbations, with 
statistical weight given to the most likely trajectories.  With a fuller understanding of the 
trajectories that lead to alarm and safety system activations and failures, using both 
methods, operators and plant managers can better protect processes from transitioning 
toward unsafe operating conditions. 
 
5.2 A Systematic Approach for Simulation-Based Safety Analysis 
 While IPDs and TPS can be used individually to improve failure probability 
predictions, acting together, they can provide a fuller understanding of rare safety events.  
Each method relies on dynamic process models, which can be cumbersome to construct.  
Usually, beginning with steady-state models, appropriate dynamic terms are added, then 
controllers, and eventually alarm and safety systems, are modeled.  Alarm and safety 
systems often involve operator decisions – usually involving stochastic modeling.  The 
construction of these models often requires substantial time and effort.  However, 
modeling for various design and control decisions is normally carried out in the chemical 
manufacturing industries, so these models are often not built solely for alarm and safety 
system analyses.  With dynamic process and operator models, IPDs and TPS can be 
applied, both during the design and commissioning phases. 
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 Beyond the dynamic modeling in generating IPDs, TPS provides a framework for 
generating more likely paths leading to alarm and safety system actions.  Random 
perturbations allow for various trial trajectories to be calculated, and then accepted or 
rejected based upon their likelihood.  This approach is structured to encourage potentially 
un-postulated trajectories to be ‘discovered’.  Its results may aid process managers during 
the design phase, where HAZOP is performed to assess potential process accidents.  
HAZOP analysis focuses on individual process units, the chemical compounds that may 
enter the unit, and the possible failures encountered by the unit.  Without accounting for 
more complex process interactions (such as in material or heat recycle), HAZOP does not 
identify the most probable special-cause event trajectories on the process scale.  Said 
differently, as the fluctuations within a process unit influence all downstream units, 
failure probabilities of similar units vary amongst different processes.  TPS is well-suited 
to quantify the paths leading to special-cause events, possibly terminating with safety 
interlock shutdown or an accident.  This method has the potential to calculate path 
trajectories that are either not postulated during HAZOP analysis, or events determined to 
be of far less significance than may be envisioned in the specific process design. 
Even when TPS does not uncover un-postulated special-cause events, it often extends our 
understanding of postulated events.  TPS helps plant managers identify operational 
conditions that render events more dangerous – possibly during a demand rate shift, or in 
the presence of another process disturbance.  With process interactions leading to special-
cause events well understood, the failure of alarm and safety-interlock systems may be 
prevented through safer operations that avoid their activation. 
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The TPS technique calculates many trajectories of special-cause events, and their 
associated probabilities.  Using this information, probability distributions of special-cause 
events can be constructed.  Note that IPDs in Chapters 2 and 3 are generated to estimate 
the failure probabilities of alarm and safety systems from particular special-cause events.  
The special-cause events, and the distributions of special-cause event magnitudes, can be 
quite challenging to quantify.  With few such events, few data are available to directly 
calculate these distributions.  Rather, TPS can be used to generate  distributions of the 
most probable special-cause events along with their magnitudes, which can be input to 
generate the IPDs for the failure probabilities of alarm and safety systems – even those 
that involve complex human factors.  The synergy of these two methods is quite 
powerful, even with few data (or no data, in the process design phase), permitting the 
probabilities of special-cause events and the associated failure probabilities of alarm and 
safety systems to be better estimated.   
 While TPS calculates the trajectory probabilities leading to alarm and safety 
system failures, the IPD is better suited for this purpose.  The backwards integration 
feature required in TPS, accomplished through the solution of a boundary-value problem, 
does not permit stochastic operator response times to be modeled.  In the simulations to 
obtain IPDs, operator response times are calculated upon the activation of alarm 
thresholds, with response times a function of the derivatives of variables as they cross 
their thresholds, and the number of other active alarms in the process.  Other factors were 
investigated (the demand rate of the process, reactant feed composition), but did not 
correlate well with operator response times.  The factors were used to generate a 
distribution of response times from which a response time is sampled and simulated.   
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With backwards integration, this approach cannot be taken the response time of the 
operator must be purely deterministic.  Therefore, the IPD technique is capable of 
accounting for stochastic operator responses, and thus is better suited for estimating 
alarm and safety system failure probabilities.   
 
5.3 Future Work 
In future work, three areas are worthy of consideration, as discussed briefly in the next 
subsections. 
5.3.1 Rare-Event Sampling Strategies 
 TPS was developed by the molecular simulations community as a technique for 
studying rare-events.  This thesis adapted the technique to handle rare process dynamic 
events.  While TPS has provided many exciting opportunities in the molecular 
simulations community, other sampling strategies have been developed to handle similar 
problems.  Three such techniques are forward flux sampling (FFS), milestoning, and 
transition interface probabilities (Allen et al., 2009). 
The main computational effort when applying TPS to process dynamics is in solving the 
boundary-value problem, often accounting for well over 90% of the computation time in 
the two examples in Chapter 4.  This limitation is circumvented by FFS, which does not 
require the calculation of backward-integrated trajectories.  The general approach of this 
method involves an order parameter,  , that spans the two regions of interest from     
at the interface to region A and     at the interface to region B.  The probability of a 
trajectory transitioning from:   
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        to     ;                          
 (5.1) 
is calculated for all    in [0,1].  In this manner, the probability of a trajectory spanning 
from region A to region B can be calculated.  Additionally, the rate of formation of 
trajectories is calculated.   
This method may provide further insights toward understanding special-cause events in 
process dynamics.  Trajectories spanning the two regions (from green- to red-belt zones) 
are calculated using FFS without solving a boundary-value problem.  Thus, the 
computational efficiency of FFS shifts to the efficiency of forward integration.  Similar to 
TPS, random perturbations are introduced, retaining the potential to discover un-
postulated trajectories.  Furthermore, in TPS, the event time must be fixed, whereas in 
FFS the time length is allowed to vary.  This can be important in setting alarm thresholds 
that give operators sufficient time to take corrective action. 
 
5.3.2 Operator Decision Modeling 
 The informed prior distribution technique utilizes operator decision models, 
which seek to quantify operator response times as a function of various factors within the 
process.  These include the state of the process during a special-cause event, which has 
significant impact on the operator’s ability to diagnose and appropriately respond to 
events.  Also, information pertaining to the specific operators describing those that are 
most effective and better trusted to handle more challenging tasks (larger demand rate 
shifts or operational shifts) is helpful.  Furthermore, the time-of-day or time-of-year may 
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play a critical role in determining operator’s successes.  A better understanding of these 
phenomena may influence scheduled shutdown periods or rate shifts at a plant. 
 
 
5.3.3 Alarm and Safety System Design 
This thesis has presented techniques for estimating the failure probabilities of rarely 
activated alarm and safety systems in chemical processes.  These estimates permit 
engineers and plant managers to install more effective systems.  Through the use of 
transition path sampling and informed prior distributions, better choices of alarmed 
variables, alarm thresholds, operator training, operator decisions, and automatic safety 
systems, can be selected.  As the dynamic risk analysis community continues to develop 
sophisticated methods for understanding the performance of alarm and safety systems, 
better operational and design decisions will be implemented (Khan, 2015). 
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